American intelligence and Unit 731
Although some of the international connections concerning the disapproval of the research and usage of BW were seemingly strong during World War II and after Japan’s surrender, the U.S. appears to have started its secrecy campaign on the topic at least as early as 1943. Some connections were stronger, such as that between the U.S. and the U.K., who frequently shared their pre-war reports on BW—even if this connection later weakened once
the U.S. occupied Japan. When the U.S. started its own, well organized BW studies at Camp Detrick in 1943, doubts and confusion arose about the worldwide communication of observed enemy activities involving BW usage. The topic was acknowledged as somewhat sensitive due to the potential panic it could cause among civilians and military troops, if any news should be leaked. In 1943, reports of Japanesenese atrocities towards American troops were discussed by President Roosevelt, MacArthur and the Joint Chief of Staff, who debated whether or not to release the information to the public. MacArthur himself first suggested sharing the information, but quickly reversed his opinion.
the U.S. occupied Japan. When the U.S. started its own, well organized BW studies at Camp Detrick in 1943, doubts and confusion arose about the worldwide communication of observed enemy activities involving BW usage. The topic was acknowledged as somewhat sensitive due to the potential panic it could cause among civilians and military troops, if any news should be leaked. In 1943, reports of Japanesenese atrocities towards American troops were discussed by President Roosevelt, MacArthur and the Joint Chief of Staff, who debated whether or not to release the information to the public. MacArthur himself first suggested sharing the information, but quickly reversed his opinion.
|
Regarding biological warfare, secrecy additionally encircled the U.S.’ own military attachés, secret services and military intelligence offices. No one was quite certain what kind of information should be distributed to the United States’ own departments, or even to their counterparts of other allied nations. This suspicion and the lack of proper reports could
have been the basis for the wall of secrecy upheld by the U.S., when it seized the information it received during and after the war. The secrecy was later justified with the safety of U.S.’s own troops in post-war Japan, and a positive outlook about Japan’s future was strongly promoted in order to move on from the horrors of the war. To possibly describe the attitude of how the Western nations approached the impeding interrogations of suspected BW scientists is colored by expectations the U.K. and U.S. had about Japanese people. When interrogating the former Pingfan scientist, Col. Enryo Hojo located in Germany, the head of the British BW research, Paul Fildes, said in 1945 that he was not surprised about the weak outcome of the interrogations, because “it would be very difficult to get information .... particularly from such people as the Japanese”. |
Interrogating a captured Japanese general
|
Despite being provided with statements from Japanese PWs, reports and letters from Chinese officials, and having their own confirmed sources of BW,
American intelligence maintained a seemingly careful and suspicious approach to the true scale of the Japanese BW research. Intelligence operations acknowledged some of the German and Japanese BW incidents as early as 1943, but mainly stood by their own “reliable sources”. It was no longer a secret that Japan was conducting a level of BW research, and utmost secrecy had to be maintained when discussing the topic and findings of intelligence departments.
American intelligence maintained a seemingly careful and suspicious approach to the true scale of the Japanese BW research. Intelligence operations acknowledged some of the German and Japanese BW incidents as early as 1943, but mainly stood by their own “reliable sources”. It was no longer a secret that Japan was conducting a level of BW research, and utmost secrecy had to be maintained when discussing the topic and findings of intelligence departments.
Dismissal of evidence
|
Moreover, a month prior to Thompson’s final conclusions, David Nelson Sutton from the Investigation Division of International Prosecution Section (IPS) had transmitted a 37 page report of his findings about the alleged Japanese use of CW and BW in China. He had accompanied Xiang Zhejun and Col. Thomas H. Morrow to China to investigate. This report was submitted to Keenan on April 12 after they returned to Tokyo. Sutton was specifically responsible for investigation of Japanese biological warfare, and Morrow was responsible for investigation of Japanese chemical warfare. Sutton’s report on biological warfare in China detailed events that occurred after the Japanese dropped grain and other substances in the air on October 4, 1940, in Quxian, Zhejiang province; October 27, 1940, in Nimbo, Zhejiang province; and November 4, 1941 in Changde, which was followed by the local plague outbreak, and presented evidence including the clinical records and analyses by epidemiologists.
|
Chinese civilians being buried alive by Japanese troops.
|
While Thompson’s investigation was coming to an end, the Tokyo War Crimes Trial was officially starting in May 1946. Soon after the trial had begun, the Chinese Division’s CW charges against the Japanese were erased from the IPS program. Moreover, the Soviets had gained valuable confessions from three captured Japanese BW personnel, who had provided details of the BW experiments. The Soviets offered to bring them to testify at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, but the IPS was against it, with an excuse that they would not have enough credentials to be trusted in court nor were there any documents to support their claims. The chemical warfare proof was eliminated due to concern of CWS and G-2: Because of the U.S.’ own research on the topic, charges and indictments could cause more anxiety in the general population learning the opinion of the study and about CW usage.
Related Book
|
Unit 731 Cover-up :
|