Admiral Oikawa Approves Alliance
Regarding the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty, I thought the Navy initially would not approve the pact. This assumption was based on the Navy’s attitude during the days of the Hiranuma Cabinet. At the time of the Cabinet organization, Navy Minister Zengo Yoshida agreed to the idea of strengthening the Tripartite Axis. As the talks developed, however, the Tripartite Alliance proposed stipulations on military aid which became significantly worrisome for the Navy and Minister Yoshida. Eventually, a worsening heart condition forced him to resign.
Signing ceremony for the Axis Powers Tripartite Pact
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When Admiral Oikawa became the Navy Minister, the Navy abruptly approved the Tripartite Alliance, arousing my suspicion. The then Vice-Minister Toyoda, commenting on the circumstances, said:
“Truthfully, at heart, the Navy is opposed to the Tripartite Pact, but since the domestic political situation no longer permits further opposition on the Navy’s part, the Navy unavoidably approves it, albeit, for political reasons. From a military standpoint, the Navy has no confidence in fighting the United States.” |
Prince Konoe: “This is something I did not expect. Politics is something which no statesman deals with and the Navy need not be concerned with it. The Navy should examine the matter purely from a military standpoint and, if it lacks confidence, it should oppose it to the end. Isn’t that the way to demonstrate loyalty to the country?” |
Vice-Minister Toyoda said:
“Now that the situation has come to this point, please try to understand the Navy’s position. Other than diplomatic negotiations, there is no longer any other way to prevent the increased obligation of military assistance in the Tripartite Pact.”
Naval Leaders Still Cautious
When American-Japanese negotiations began, both the Army and Navy enthusiastically hoped for a successful conclusion. By August, however, the Army’s enthusiasm had begun to diminish. I heard strong views from lower-ranked naval officers and when questioned, they responded unconcernedly “We shall control such blind movements.”
At a liaison conference, the Chief of the Naval General Staff declared clearly “If the United States alone is the other party, we have some confidence in fighting, but if the Soviet Union enters the conflict, requiring us to conduct operations in the north and the south, our confidence will be gone.”
When October arrived and my cabinet members were on the verge of resigning, naval leaders still favored continuing American-Japanese negotiations. In view of their relations with the Army and the internal relations of the Navy, they did not openly state their preference. Instead, they entrusted the matter to the Prime Minister.
At a liaison conference, the Chief of the Naval General Staff declared clearly “If the United States alone is the other party, we have some confidence in fighting, but if the Soviet Union enters the conflict, requiring us to conduct operations in the north and the south, our confidence will be gone.”
When October arrived and my cabinet members were on the verge of resigning, naval leaders still favored continuing American-Japanese negotiations. In view of their relations with the Army and the internal relations of the Navy, they did not openly state their preference. Instead, they entrusted the matter to the Prime Minister.
The Japanese embassy in Berlin clad in the flags of the three signatories of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940
The third reason to avoid a Japanese-American conflict concerned our dependence on the United States and Britain for munitions, which made us vulnerable. Several times I ordered the Planning Board to look for alternatives to possibly eliminate this vulnerability but, invariably, the result was “impossible.”
The normalization of American-Japanese trade and economic activities in the Southwest Pacific constituted one area of American-Japanese negotiations aimed at acquiring the needed munitions.
In the course of the negotiations, however, the United States invoked the Asset-Freezing Act which blocked the acquisition and replenishment of materials. Since the continual decrease of goods in storage would lead to what was called “jirihin” (general impoverishment), the problem became acute.
The normalization of American-Japanese trade and economic activities in the Southwest Pacific constituted one area of American-Japanese negotiations aimed at acquiring the needed munitions.
In the course of the negotiations, however, the United States invoked the Asset-Freezing Act which blocked the acquisition and replenishment of materials. Since the continual decrease of goods in storage would lead to what was called “jirihin” (general impoverishment), the problem became acute.
Related Book
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Memoir by Prince Konoe:
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