Urban Warfare in the Pacific: Strategy, Tactics, and Victory in the Battle of Manila

by Isaac Bly

The Battle of Manila (February 3rd - March 3rd, 1945) represents a significant chapter in Filipino and American history. The battle lasted 29 days, officially ending Japanese control of the city. The month-long struggle is said to have claimed approximately 100,000 civilian lives in one of the most brutal chapters of the war and one of the largest urban operations in US military history.[1] Furthermore, the memory and history of this battle have faced increasing scrutiny, with greater attention placed on the conduct and decisions of its commanders, the scale of civilian lives that suffered and were affected, and the battle’s relevance in the future of urban warfare. 

Map of the early phase of the Luzon campaign Source: United States Military Academy West Point

The Conquering Tide

In July 1937, Chinese forces stood almost wholly alone against the Japanese that crossed the Marco Polo Bridge. However, in January 1945, the balance of power in the Second World War had transformed from the grim early years.[2] Following Pearl Harbor (December 7th, 1941) Japanese forces surrounded American and Philippine forces stationed on Corregidor Island and eventually forced them to surrender after a months-long battle as Japanese forces stormed across Asia.[3] As the war in Europe began to come to a close with an Allied victory in sight, American attention moved towards subduing the Imperial Japanese Empire throughout greater Asia. Japanese forces found themselves bogged down on several fronts as the combined air, sea, and land forces of the United States cut apart the Japanese empire in twin drives. The United States decided on an invasion of the Philippines starting with the island of Leyte over the island of Formosa (modern-day Taiwan) following fierce negotiations.[4]
Following the American invasion of the Marianas Islands, the exiled “Tiger of Malaya” General Yamashita was summoned to organize the defense of the Philippines as the head of the 14th Area Army.[5] Yamashita quickly realized how desperate this situation was considering his critical supply constraints, the crushing strength of Allied forces, and the organized guerilla movements that opposed them.[6] Yamashita decided against defending the beaches or plains and instead focused on holding the mountains of Luzon.[7] He set about dividing Japanese troops into groups named Kembu, Shobu, and Shimbu, the latter occupying the area around Manila.[8] However, the defense of Manila ultimately was not Yamashita’s official decision. Though strategically important, the large population was overwhelmingly hostile and Yamashita did not wish to commit a significant body of troops to defend the highly flammable city. Manila also housed a large population which required the IJA to feed and provide supplies for the evacuation process.[9] Despite this, he abstained from declaring it an open city as MacArthur had before him.[10]

The issue at the heart of the defense of Manila by the Japanese was the struggle for coordination and command within a system of fierce interservice rivalry, with a changing roster of commanders with varying intentions even before the Americans landed.[11] Subordinate to the Army commander, Lt. Gen. Yokoyama, was an Army Manila Defense Force under Maj. Gen. Kobayashi which had mostly left by January 25th, 1945. and a Manila Naval Defense Force (MNDF) created later, under his ‘operational control’ though it generally acted autonomously with a greater loyalty to Naval authorities.*[12] The MNDF had been created by Vice Adm. Okochi, the commander of the Southwestern Area Fleet out of Rear Adm. Iwabuchi’s 31st Naval Special Base Force that the defense of certain key areas in the city was to be conducted as well as a more extensive demolition routine than the Army.[13] Across two conferences in January, Iwabuchi made it clear he would defend Manila in accordance with the previous command, and afraid of straining the bitter and never-ending interservice rivalry, Yokoyama yielded, folding the MNDF into his plan as best he could, handing over the local Army units.[14] It would be Rear Admiral Iwabuchi, leader of the Manila Naval Defense Forces (MNDF), a dishonored naval officer who had survived the sinking of his ship at Guadalcanal who would lead his men to their death in Manila.[15] Iwabuchi thus fortified Manila and prepared for the oncoming onslaught to hold the city in the face of a long siege.

In parallel with Iwabuchi’s conferences, the US XIV Corps under General Griswold landed alongside I Corps in the southern area of Lingayen Gulf on January 9, 1945, and quickly advanced south across the central Luzon, the 37th Infantry Division pushing down Route 3 towards Manila, linking with guerrilla forces along the way.[16]

With orders from the South West Pacific Commander Douglas MacArthur, the 1st Cavalry Division was ordered to drive to Manila to free the internees at Santo Tomas and secure Malacanang Palace and the Legislative Building.[17] General MacArthur had both strong personal and strategic reasons for making haste for Manila, the city had immense strategic value for the current in the Philippines and future operations in Japan, moreover, it had been his family home for decades before he fled to Bataan and then Corregidor Island where he earned his fame.[18] Understanding his clear intent, the 1st Cavalry formed three lean ‘flying columns’ to race ahead beyond supporting forces composed of tanks, motorized infantry, and a small support complement of engineers, medical units, and mobile artillery which traversed 100 miles in three days against mostly light resistance.[19]

US infantrymen landed on the south side of the Pasig on the 23rd of February, 1945. Source: US Archives

The Peculiar Fight to the River Pasig

An estimated number of about 2,000 soldiers of the flying column under Brigadier General William Chase were screened by aircraft.[20] As the 1st Cavalry’s flying column rolled the Angat River, they came into contact with Filipino guerillas who provided information and guidance for the Americans bringing a detachment to Santo Tomas Internment Camp which contained some 3,700 Allied prisoners.[21] Though most of the malnourished prisoners were freed once Filipino and American forces entered the former university on February 3rd, some hostages had been hastily taken by Japanese soldiers in the Education building who eventually marched out under a truce the next day.[22]
The 1st Cavalry continued to press towards the Pasig River, securing the barely defended Malacanan palace.[23] However, the cavalrymen were halted at Quezon Boulevard, running into one of the best-fortified positions north of the Pasig, taking automatic from reinforced structures along a path strewn with mines and improvised obstacles.[24] Half of the flying column retired to Santo Tomas, consolidating until reinforcements arrived.[25] 
Even as the 1st Cavalry barrelled ahead, American forces had severely limited information on the tactical situation in Manila before beginning serious engagements with Japanese forces.[26] There were doubts whether Manila could be taken without extensive damage. Upon his return, MacArthur, who declared Manila an open city in 1942, still maintained hopes of keeping Manila intact so that he could parade through as its liberator once the war was over.[27] With continuing hopes to spare the “Pearl of the Orient,” airstrikes were prohibited and artillery was heavily restricted to certain verified targets or counter-battery missions.[28] Nevertheless, on the ground, the reality of the fighting was clear, XIV Corps would take the city by force, securing water and electricity infrastructure for the population and isolating the Japanese to prevent reinforcement.[29]

Northeast of Santo Tomas, the 7th Cavalry Regiment streaked east, capturing Novaliches dam through the Balara Water Filters just five miles north of Manila. After, the regiment headed to the Juan Reservoir two miles further south along with the associated pipelines feeding the city. This route secured the critical water infrastructure needed to sustain the city by the 3rd of February.[30] However, despite stopping the Japanese demolition attempt, any hopes of retaining the Tullahan bridge near Novaliches were extinguished when a Japanese night raid slipped through and destroyed the crossing, thus restricting transport to the city while the division front had expanded massively.[31]
Following the raid, the newly arrived 37th Infantry Division completed its rescue mission into the Bilibid Prison.[32] Earlier, on January 31st, 1945, under the 8th Army, the 11th Airborne Division landed two glider regiments in the Batangas Province, connecting with the remaining parachute regiment that dropped three days earlier. The newly deployed regiment came to a halt 20 miles south of Manila before the heavily defended Nichols Field which was awaiting heavy equipment.[33]

The forces that awaited the Americans and Filipinos were a strange conglomerate of 17,000 naval forces (of which 12,500 were assigned to Manila) and 4,500 soldiers of the IJA who lacked weapons, experience, and relevant training.[34] However, the Manila Naval Defense Forces (MNDF) salvaged large amounts of weaponry from the crippled air and naval craft, giving them heavy equipment disproportionate to the size of their formations–particularly with automatic weapons that replaced rifles as the primary armament of the defenders who took to emplacing the array of naval armaments, rockets, and army artillery pieces into fortified positions across the city.[35] Though Manila was highly flammable, its modern structures were robustly built often with wide fields of fire owing to the city’s open boulevards which combined with meticulous fortification inside and outside turned Japanese positions into strongholds.[36] If there was a center to the defense, it was the walled city of Intramuros with the expected main American effort to come from the south.[37] 


The Japanese plan was characteristically stubborn, aiming to maximize the attrition of Allied forces, prevent access to the city’s ports, and destroy its usefulness for future military operations.[38] With every bridge destroyed, any crossing of the Pasig River had to be amphibious and hindered by Japanese artillery and fierce fires started during withdrawal.[39] The day after a hasty and paradoxical declaration from MacArthur that the battle for Manila had been won on the 6th of February, the 148th Regiment of the 37th Division prepared to cross the Pasig near the Malacanang palace where they had taken the place of the 1st Cavalry, launching their assault boats at 15:15 in the afternoon under cover of artillery and poorly placed smoke.[40] Documents and written evidence recovered from the Chinese Cemetery made it apparent that the Japanese intended to fight to the death.[41] While the 148th Regiment pressed out their bridgehead with armor unable to follow until the 6th, the 1st Cavalry began to wheel out east onto the flank while the 11th Airborne pushed toward Nichols Field.[42] With the brutal experience along the Pasig resulting in the loosening of artillery restrictions in the face of division-destroying attrition, the noose around Manila had been fitted.[43]

US Army, Reports of General MacArthur - Diagram of the US advance and Japanese movements in and around Manila. Source: US Archives

The Course of the Battle from Provisor to the Intramuros
The Battle of Manila was a unique series of engagements in the Pacific War fought in a large metropole that contained overwhelmingly friendly civilians, against an enemy largely composed of naval forces, almost uniformly inexperienced and poorly trained, heavily reliant on salvaged naval and aircraft armaments.[44] The defending force’s efforts were characterized by improvisation often without connection to existing doctrine and their exploitation of the civilian population for their own defense.[45] Equally problematic was the near absence of communication and intelligence which prevented any serious assessment of US or Filipino guerrilla strength and inhibited any attempts to coordinate fire or prioritize certain positions.[46] The Japanese defended passively with limited tactical depth, though their static behavior had a strong basis within their commander’s intent for a stubborn defense of key positions.[47] Individually, artillery was accurate but never massed: singular positions were fanatically held but done so alone and when a more aggressive stance was taken, they were poorly planned from frontal charges to night raids.[48]

MacArthur, who had repeatedly misinterpreted the strength and intent of his enemies, had pushed his subordinates to Manila perhaps too quickly, with the 1st Cavalry arriving alone before sharing its cramped operational area with the 37th Infantry Division.[49] American troops were usually experienced and well-trained, even in urban operations, and the battle did not significantly deviate militarily from established US doctrine in the broad strokes, improvisation was still central to US tactics.[50] With streets as boundaries, guided often by Filipino guerrillas and civilians, and leaving a team behind to guard the exits to buildings under assault, the assaulting troops hopefully followed by immediate reinforcements.[51] US forces rushed to the top floor, crossing from roof to roof, and then working their way down, breaching walls and floors to employ grenades and flamethrowers, usually attacking in the squad or platoon level, proving very successful.[52] Assault teams (or platoons) used flamethrowers, bazookas, demolitions, and machines in a greater density than normal, usually approaching with smoke from supporting mortars and suppression provided by machine guns.[53] Direct fire from tanks, artillery, and tank destroyers was used against every building but was most effective on buildings that had been mostly ruined by hours of shelling, with the 155­mm howitzer proving invaluable on many occasions.[54] Tanks and tank destroyers were often required to make progress in destroying positions and driving infantry into the open despite the vehicle’s vulnerability at close range.[55]

Japanese forces made extensive use of poorly laid and partly buried mines with large quantities of improvised explosives originating from depth charges and aviation bombs.[56] The infantry-tank team provided a useful advantage with a unique engineer-tank team where the tank covered the engineer and towed disposed mines in coordination with supporting infantry overcoming the tactical issue that had overshadowed the technical challenge of disarming the devices.[57] Even with the initial restriction, artillery and mortars were irreplaceable, alongside guerillas in interdicting lines of communication as well as breaching, flushing out, and reducing fortifications, though at immense cost to Manila and its people.[58] The extent to which the limitations on firepower, particularly airpower, protected the city and its residence is unclear–though the artillery restrictions certainly increased the difficulty of the fighting for Allied forces.

U.S. infantrymen make a house to house search for Japanese inside the ruins of the walled city, from which they had liberated hundreds of Filipino prisoners, 23 February 1945. Source: US Archives

With the Botocan Hydro Station out of reach, the mission to secure power for Manila came to rest on the seizure of the Provisor Island electrical facilities, comprising five large buildings and smaller outlying structures–a battle that would last several days and nights.[59] On February 9th, the 129th Regiment of the 37th Infantry began their assault through the smoke and flames, taking heavy fire from the Japanese naval battalion.[60] The battles within the complex of buildings and machines devolved into a cat-and-mouse game in complete darkness as artillery, mortars, and armored vehicles pounded the small island buildings–heavily damaging the central steam plant and leaving the city without power for the rest of the battle.[61]
In the south, though not intended for such intensive operations, the 11th Airborne began their assault on a series of 1,200 pillboxes and reinforced structures stretching from Manila Bay to Fort McKinley covered by 20mm, 40mm, 90mm anti-aircraft guns and artillery ranging from 6-inch naval guns to 150mm mortars.[62] Structure by structure through serpentine trenches and reliant on smaller artillery and air support, US forces made liberal use of flamethrowers and white phosphorus grenades alongside tanks and tank destroyers, in meticulous attacks while one regiment engaged and the other maneuvered.[63] Seizing Nichols Field in the center of the defense was extremely difficult: the airfield had been turned into a fortress and was one of the most ferociously defending positions of the battle packed with salvaged naval guns.[64] The 11th Airborne’s lower caliber divisional guns struggled against resilient Japanese fortifications, requiring assistance from Corps-level artillery and Marine Aviation.[65] They suffered heavy losses, securing the now ruined airfield on the 11th of February.[66] Fort McKinley fell to elements of the 1st Cavalry and the 11th Airborne, the fort had been mostly evacuated by the time of its seizure on the 17th, Iwabuchi having decided to stay in Manila despite attempts to recall him to McKinley.[67] Aware of the envelopment and pressure on the eastern flanks, Japanese forces in and around Manila attempted piecemeal night-time counterattacks via poorly coordinated infiltration efforts in the east on the 15th and 16th of February which, as Iwabuchi had grimly predicted, resulted in little progress despite initial optimism.[68] In parallel with their operations against the Allied militaries, the Japanese had commenced operations against the Filipinos inside Manila with an MNDF order issued after the 15th of February stating, “[...] 5. When Filipinos are to be killed, they must be gathered into one place and disposed of with the consideration that ammunition and manpower must not be used to excess. Because the disposal of dead bodies is a troublesome task, they should be gathered into houses which are scheduled to be burned or demolished. They should also be thrown into the river.”[69]

American cavalrymen entering the Rizal stadium and ammo dump on the 16th. Source: Wiki

The struggle for Manila Hotel and Rizal Stadium inaugurated the battle for the strongpoints, where all resistance would be driven to the Intramuros or destroyed with the burden falling heavily on the riflemen who took 90% of all losses.[70] Even after applying the lessons from the fighting in the north, they suffered from the mental and physical strain of combat as they viewed the compounding horrors against combatants and civilians.[71] The battle for the famous Manila Hotel was typical of the combat occurring across the city: cavalrymen began the brutal room-to-room fighting on the 21st with the Japanese attempting to reoccupy lost rooms and finishing with American forces clearing the building’s bomb shelter.[72] With the eastern flank finally closing to the sea at Manila Bay by the 12th, the fighting for and in the Rizal stadium complex was quite costly for the 5th and 12th Cavalry regiments.[73] The structures possessed wide fields of fire[74] and it was difficult for vehicles to access the complex with firing ports chipped into its thick walls with wide fields of fire. Inside, past the sandbag fortifications, heavy bunkers studded the baseball diamond that could only be cleared after two attacks, with tanks, artillery, and riflemen by 18 February.[75] Similarly, fierce fighting occurred from the 19th to the 20th near Isaac Peral Street over control of the High Commissioner’s residence, Army-Navy Club, Elks Club, and their surrounding buildings as the 12th Cavalry Regiment pushed through enemy fire in multiple directions.[76] Increasingly American and Filipino forces came to question the humanity of the Japanese they fought, columns of disheveled, wounded, and violated civilians crowding past them, PFC Edwin Hanson who had witnessed the strew bodies of mothers and children, remarked, “[how many Filipinos] must have either been burned, shot down, or just left homeless—all in a last few days of vengeful orgy by some ‘so called’ people named Japs.”[77]

From the 12th to the 20th of February, the 129th Infantry (and later the 145th) pulverized and captured the earthquake-proof New Police Station and its nearby buildings, incurring significant losses of men and armor.[78] The City Hall was perhaps easier because it only required 145 mostly point-blank 155mm shells and various other munitions before the infantry could finish off the Japanese inside.[79] The Central Post Office proved practically impenetrable, enduring a three-day siege from divisional and Corps artillery.[80] Despite the tunnels to the Intramuros, the unreinforced garrison was forced into the basement after heavy attrition.[81] The 148th Infantry’s progress to the Manila General Hospital and University, the core of the Japanese defenses in the sector, relied heavily on artillery and mortar support.[82] Encountering the well-defended hospital on the 14th, and struggled to make a foothold while trying to reduce civilian casualties for the Filipinos trapped inside, once aware of their presence.[83] After days of tedious hand-to-hand combat reinforcements, the 5th Cavalry subdued the building and relieved the 7,000 civilians remaining inside.[84] With the hospital’s fall on the 17th, which reduced the firepower protecting the formidable and reinforced University, the 5th Cavalry engaged in an agonizing back-and-forth battle through narrow halls and Japanese tunnel systems, requiring engineers to pour a mixture of gasoline and oil into the tunnel entrance and ignite it to clear out the Japanese, only to need to assault the building again when it was reoccupied.[85] The last ten days of battle to reach Intramuros had cost the Americans roughly 60 men killed and 445 wounded and the148th Infantry suffered 105 casualties from sickness, heat exhaustion, and “combat fatigue.”*[86]

Unknown, “Puerta de Parian (Parian Gate) of Intramuros,” American Public University System, accessed August 5, 2024, https://exhibit.apus.edu/items/show/1339.

The Siege of the Intramuros and the Government Centre

With detailed information from Filipino escapees from the Spanish fortress about the Japanese defenses and tunnel system. US forces attempted to negotiate a surrender, hoping to avoid the inevitably bloody battle or at the very least allow for the release of the Filipino civilians inside, efforts that proved to be in vain.[87] Once again, Japanese forces refused to take the most basic actions to protect the civilians under their control.
The 17th-century Spanish walled city of Intramuros represented one of the most complex fortifications in the city, occupied by countless civilians.[88] With walls 40 feet thick at its base and 25 feet high with sturdy stone, brick and concrete buildings inside the city were reinforced with modern weaponry.[89] From the 17th to the 23rd, divisional and corps artillery and armor bombarded Intramuros, the last barrage on the 23rd totalling 7,896 shells in one hour.[90] 145th Regiment, 37th Infantry led the way in a precisely timed attack, scrambling over the fallen walls, followed by the 129th Regiment making an amphibious landing in the north, dividing Japanese forces into isolated pockets in street fighting, pressing past refugees in the ruins of the great city.[91] Inside the city, the Allied troops would discover a panoply of massacres in the burnt churches and homes, of just male civilians the Japanese had executed 4,000 in as little as a few weeks for no justifiable reason, one of the countless atrocities occurring inside and outside the Walled City.[92]

While bulldozers cleared the rubble and obstacles for tanks and the infantry cleared houses and churches room by room of Japanese and Formosan auxiliaries, the Americans found their toughest fighting at Fort Santiago.[93] The Spanish fortress had been the site of countless cruel massacres, its sealed dungeons having been reopened to be made into the headquarters of the infamous Japanese Kempeitai, secret military police, its murky caverns were only pacified by the application of every possible combination of flames and explosives.[94] By the 24th of February, the 37th had subdued the whole of Intramuros struggling to cope with the refugees as its remaining regiment finished off the Japanese in the port in support of the 12th Cavalry Regiment.[95] 

The last major engagements in Manila centered around Agriculture, Finance, and Legislative Buildings. Reinforced concrete public structures, each a fortress in its own right, had their entrances barricaded, fighting positions installed inside and utilized an elevated view of the wide and open fields of fire around them to direct fire across the city.[96] With Filipino warnings of how well-supplied the garrisons were, American General of XIV Corps Griswold ruled out starving the garrison.[97] So once again, artillery began to pound the buildings concurrently on the 23rd, using every weapon in their arsenal en-masse from 155mm guns to 105 M-7 self-propelled howitzers firing directly to 76mm tank destroyers and 75mm Sherman tanks or 4.2 inch and 81mm mortars and all manner of incendiaries and smoke.[98] Spanning several days, the 37th cleared each floor of the Legislative Building, from the top down, ending the final resistance in the basement and tunnels on the 28th of February.[99] 
The cavalrymen fighting for the Agriculture Building were repelled numerous times.[100] The building was pulverized by hours-long preparatory fires with resistance only extinguished with the infantry burning out the Japanese within the rubble under the covering fire of tanks by the afternoon of March 1st.[101] The final major building to fall was the Finance Building, once again offered a chance to surrender, taken up by 22 men on March 1st.[102] However, the Japanese would respond to the next attempt with a false surrender that was used to disrupt the following assault by the 148th Infantry, who retreated in disgust to allow another salvo in before seizing the building in its entirety on the 3rd of March, 1945.[103]

Stretcher party brings out a wounded U.S. soldier, following an attack by U.S. troops to liberate Filipino prisoners in the walled city, 23 February 1945. Note wrecked buildings. Source: US National Archives

Lessons, Costs, and Legacy.
Victory in Manila had cost the XIV Corps the lives of more than 1,000 men and 5,500 wounded within the city.[104] The Japanese suffered more than 16,000 casualties, with an additional 3,500 troops of the Shimbu group perished in the periphery or on the counterattack, with the remnants of the Manila Naval Defense Force having fled across the Marikina River.[105] Few had lost as much as the Manileño/as from the Japanese's massacres and American firepower. Those who had fought alongside the Americans or suffered under the Japanese had to salvage what remained of their city, including its devastated infrastructure and port.[106]
Militarily, the burning city proved a supreme test of the skills, resolve, and resources of the Allied forces, consuming 45,000 artillery and mortar shells in one month in battles that often came down to platoons, squads, or even fire teams.[107] Even though prior planning had been inadequate, initial intelligence misleading, and the key advantage in airpower restrained, Allied forces quickly adapted and responded to the situation by isolating the MNDF. Allied forces used their advantages, coordination, training, and firepower to maneuver and divide Japanese forces before defeating individual positions in detail, surprising the Japanese on multiple occasions with their speed and ability to concentrate force while supported by usually robust logistics and medical support.[108] Socially, culturally, economically, and personally, entire districts were nothing more than smoldering ruins. Districts like Malate and Intramuros were 93% damaged while the Port and Santa Cruz were 90% disfigured.[109] Paco, Ermita, and Binondo were 68-85% desecrated.[110] By March, 90% of the city’s famous Spanish churches and religious houses had been utterly ruined, along with their priceless century-old books and relics.[111] In a city awash with refugees inflating its population to as many as one million civilians, somewhere in the realm 100,000* died: sons and daughters, born and unborn were all killed on a scale where it would have been impossible to have lived in the city and not to have known someone who had perished in the violence.[112]

Sources: 
1. Satoshi Nakano, “Methods to Avoid Speaking the Unspeakable: Carmen Guerrero Nakpil, the Death of Manila, and Post-World War II Filipino Memory and Mourning,” Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies 48, no. 1 (2017): 27, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44089939.
2. Andrew Kelly, “The Sino-Japanese War and the Anglo-American Response,” Australasian Journal of American Studies 32, no. 2 (2013): 27, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43863854.
3. General Staff of MacArthur, “Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume 1,” Https://Www.history.army.mil/Books/Wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/Index.htm#Contents, 1994, 37-38.
4. Ian W Toll, Twilight of the Gods: War in the Western Pacific, 1944-1945 (New York, N.Y.: W. W. Norton & Company, 2020), 92-95.
5. James M Scott, Rampage: MacArthur, Yamashita, and the Battle of Manila (W. W. Norton & Company, 2018), 44.
6. 37th Infantry Division, “Summary of the Interrogation of General Yamashita and Other Responsible Commanders and Staff Officers,” n.d, 4,6, 13.
7. Scott, Rampage, 51; 37th Infantry Division, “Summary of the Interrogation of General Yamashita and Other Responsible Commanders and Staff Officers,” n.d, 4.
8. Scott, Rampage, 52.
9. Scott, Rampage, 52; Akira Muto, The Truth of the Philippines Campaign (Unpublished, GHQ Far East Command, Military History Section, 1947), 12-13.
10. Thomas M. Huber, “Battle of Manila: Tactical Lessons Relevant to Current Military Operations,” battleofmanila.org, 2001, https://battleofmanila.org/Huber/htm/huber_02.htm, 2.
11. Robert Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 50th Anniversary Commemorative Edition (Center of Military History, 1993), https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/CMH_Pub_5-10-1.pdf, 241.
12. Ricardo Trota José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre): Japanese Accounts of the Battle of Manila,” corregidor.org, 2019, https://corregidor.org/mnl/Jose/rtj_01.htm, 1; Alphonso J. Aluit, By Sword and Fire: The Destruction of Manila in World War II, 3 February - 3 March 1945 (Bookmark Press, 1995), 145. * though still the responsibility of General Yamashita. Attempts to obfuscate Yamashita’s role in the MNDFs decisions started with his trial in 1945.
13. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 241-244.
14. Scott, Rampage, 93-94; José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 2.
15. José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 1-2.
16. Kevin T. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila, February 1945” (1993), 1, 30-31.
17. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 32.
18. Scott, Rampage, 12-13, 23.
19. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 37; Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 145.
20. John C McManus, To the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945 (Penguin, 2023), 46-47.
21. Anselmo Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1986), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA165904.pdf, IV-5; McManus, To the End of the Earth, 48-49.
22. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 49, 54.
23. General Staff of MacArthur, “Reports of General MacArthur,” 271-272.
24. Huber, “Battle of Manila: Tactical Lessons Relevant to Current Military Operations,” 3; XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 1945, https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4680/, 87.
25. Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, IV-5, IV-6; XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 1945, https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4680/, 87.
26. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 38.
27. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 249.
28. XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities as Exemplified by the Battle for Manila,” 1945, https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/U_Battle_For_Manila.pdf, 20.
29. Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, 31. 
30. Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, III-4; General Staff of MacArthur, “Reports of General MacArthur, 272-273; McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 38.
31. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 233.
32. General Staff of MacArthur, “Reports of General MacArthur,” 273.
33. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 33; General Staff of MacArthur, “Reports of General MacArthur, 271-272.
34. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 244; XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 13.
35. Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, IV-10; XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 9-10.
36. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 127.
37. XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 19.
38. Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, III.
39. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 86.
40. Scott, Rampage, 203; Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, IV-7.
41. Scott, Rampage, 225, 227.
42. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 264; McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 39; Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, IV-7.
43. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 264.
44. XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 13.
45. XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 13; Caleb Ling, “The Smart City: Achieving Positions of Relative Advantage during Urban Large-Scale Combat Operations” (2019), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1085100.pdf, 86.
46. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 86-87; XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 2, 14, 19.
47. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 86-87; XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 2, 14, 19.
48. XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 15-16; José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 2.
49. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 50-51.
50. XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 26; Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, 19-20.
51. Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, III-5, 7, 38; XIV Corps, “Assault Tactics Employed as Exemplified by the Battle of Manila,” Https://Battleofmanila.org/XIV_CORPS_G-2_REPORT/Htm/XIV_II_01.Htm, 1945, 2.
52. XIV Corps, “Assault Tactics Employed,” 2; Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, III-7, 38; McManus, To the End of the Earth, 82.
53. Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, 19; XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 21-22; McManus, To the End of the Earth, 81-82.
54. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 132, 134; XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 22, 25.
55. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 87, 93; Anthony E. Hartle, “Breaching Walls in Urban Warfare,” https://Apps.dtic.mil/Sti/Pdfs/ADB006686.Pdf, 1975, 42.
56. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 25; XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 6.
57. XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 24.
58. Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, 17, 28, 35, 37.
59. Ling, “The Smart City,” 63-64.
60. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 261.
61. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 262-263; Ling, “The Smart City,” 64.
62. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 76-77.
63. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 77.
64. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 77-78; McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 42.
65. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 92; McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 42.
66. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 92; McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 42.
67. Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, IV-8; Ling, “The Smart City,” 56; José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 3.
68. José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 2; XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 15.
69. José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 4.
70. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 275-276.
71. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 275-276.
72. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 111; XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 4.
73. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 277-278; Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, III-4.
74. Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, III-4-5; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 277-279.
75. Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, III-4-5; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 277-279.
76. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 278-279.
77. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 83.
78. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 104, 108; McManus, To the End of the Earth, 84.
79. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 84.
80. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 284-285; XIV Corps, “Assault Tactics Employed as Exemplified by the Battle of Manila,” 1.
81. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 284-285; XIV Corps, “Assault Tactics Employed as Exemplified by the Battle of Manila,” 1.
​82. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 285-286.
83. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 285-286.
84. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 287-288; XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 108.
85. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 287-289.
86. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 289-290.* Now called Combat Stress, generally understood as a series of behaviors that inhibit combat efficiency as a result of trauma.
87. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 114.
88. Nelson Randall, “The Battle of Manila,” The Field Artillery Journal 35, no. 8 (1945), https://tradocfcoeccafcoepfwprod.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/fires-bulletin-archive/1945/AUG_1945/AUG_1945_FULL_EDITION.pdf, 454.
89. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 23; XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 4.
90. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 84; McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 44-45.
91. Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, IV-9.
92. Scott, Rampage, 393, 399.
93. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 85-86; XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 125.
94. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 125; Scott, Rampage, 402-403.
95. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 45.
96. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 127.
97. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 46.
98. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 46; XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 130.
99. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 132.
100. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 130.
101. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 130.
102. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 306.
103. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 306.
104. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 2.
105. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 306-307.
106. Gregory Kupsky, “The Battle for Manila,” Origins, January 2015, https://origins.osu.edu/milestones/february-2015-battle-manila?language_content_entity=en.
107. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 88.
108. XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities,” 34; McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 53-55; Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila, 21.
109. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 405.
110. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 405.
111. South West Pacific Area Military Intelligence Section General Staff, “GHQ Report of Atrocities in Manila and Palawan,” 1945, 7; Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 405-406.
112. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 81.
* The total civilian death toll is a subject of significant debate and historiographical revision and like many battles like it, unlikely to ever be certain.​

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