The Battle of Wuhan-Introduction and Prelude (Part 1)

by Quin Cho

The Strategic Importance of the Yangtze River Area
​The Yangtze River area, including Wuhan, has been the cradle of Chinese civilization and one of China's most important agricultural regions for thousands of years. The river provided a vital line of communication for the movement of people and goods, comparable only to the Yellow River to the north. Due to the strategic importance of this region, the approaches to Wuhan became the site of a large-scale, protracted campaign between the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and China’s National Revolutionary Army (NRA) during World War II. The campaign involved 400,000 Japanese and 800,000 Chinese troops (Peattie et al., 196). Despite its significance, the Battle of Wuhan remains one of the most under-researched campaigns in twentieth-century warfare, with only one book in English dedicated to the subject, focusing more on refugees than the campaign itself. This blog series aims to inform an English-speaking audience about the significant campaign that took place in central China throughout 1938, documenting an often-overlooked chapter of World War II.

The Battles of Tai’erzhuang and Xuzhou
In 1937, the Imperial Japanese Army achieved significant successes in North China, advancing along the Beijing-Wuhan and Tianjin-Nanjing railways and in the Shanghai-Nanjing area further south. During these campaigns, the IJA either rapidly outflanked and routed overextended, poorly deployed Chinese adversaries or, as in the Battle of Shanghai, ground down the Chinese defenders in a battle of urban attrition before utilizing amphibious outflanking maneuvers to force them to withdraw. However, the IJA faced a dilemma: its northern force (the North China Area Army) and more southerly force (the Central China Expeditionary Force) had not linked up to establish a continuous front. As 1938 began, the IJA aimed to have its two armies in China advance concentrically into central China, link up, and encircle the forces of the Chinese 5th War Zone in the middle of their pincers. This strategy intended not only to link the forces but also to annihilate as many of the 5th War Zone’s 50 divisions (totaling some 450,000 men) as possible (Frank, 63).
The IJA’s first attempt to link the North China Area Army and Central China Expeditionary Force began in February 1938, when three divisions attempted to converge on the city of Xuzhou from the north, northeast, and south. Despite facing strong Chinese resistance on all fronts, the three Japanese divisions were too overextended to defend their flanks effectively. This allowed the Chinese 20th Army, under Tang Enbo, to strike the flanks of the 10th Infantry Division (northern axis) and 5th Infantry Division (northeastern axis) sequentially as elements of both Japanese divisions attempted to converge on the defended village of Tai’erzhuang (Ness and Shih, 33). Similarly, Chinese forces attacked the overextended flank of the IJA’s 13th Infantry Division south of the Huai River. These engagements, part of the broader Battle of Tai’erzhuang, marked the first victories of the war for the Chinese, forcing the Japanese to withdraw (Ness and Shih, 32-33).
Despite their withdrawal from the vicinity of Xuzhou and Tai’erzhuang in April 1938, a new April 7th directive from the Imperial General Headquarters mandated a return to the offensive (Frank, 67). The offensive resumed in May, with the North China Area Army and Central China Expeditionary Force each committing four divisions to converge on the vital rail hub of Xuzhou and encircle the approximately 200,000-strong V War Zone (Frank, 67). The Central China Expeditionary Force advanced effectively against limited Chinese resistance in the south, while the North China Area Army was held up by Tang Enbo’s fighting withdrawal (elastic defense) in the north (Ness and Shih, 34). Nevertheless, the questionable deployment of Chinese forces, often stacked along railway lines, created gaps and weak points that the Japanese exploited (Frank, 67). As a result, the Japanese were able to encircle the Chinese forces at Xuzhou. Although many Chinese troops (roughly 200-300,000) managed to break out of the encirclement due to insufficient Japanese infantry to hold the ring, the Chinese forces were still in headlong retreat, moving into the interior of China (Frank, 68).
In the aftermath of the Battle of Xuzhou, the Japanese continued their westward advance along the Long-Hai Railway, connecting Xuzhou and Zhengzhou. To stem their advance, Chiang Kai-shek adopted a radical measure: breaching the dykes of the Yellow River at Huayuankou, flooding the area to impede the Japanese advance along the railway (Peattie et al., 195). This strategy of “using water as a substitute for soldiers” contributed to the Japanese decision to reorient their advance towards Wuhan. However, the lack of warning to local civilians about the breaching of the dykes resulted in the deaths of an estimated 893,608 people due to the sudden flooding of the Yellow River plains (Frank, 70).

Works Cited
Frank, Richard B. Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War, July 1937-May 1942. W.W. Norton & Company, 2021. 
Ness, Leland. Kangzhan. Helion and Company, 2016. 
Peattie, Mark. The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945. Stanford University Press, 2022. ​

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