Shifting Tides: U.S. Policy and Japan's Rise in East Asia from Perry to Manchuria

by Jenny Chan

The early 20th century witnessed rapid changes in East Asia: from Japan's rise as a military power to the destabilizing occupation of Manchuria. During this period, U.S. foreign policy adapted to these shifting dynamics, balancing its interests with concerns about peace, stability, and growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States played a big role in foreign policy to aid Japan from the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) to Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1931.

Japan was a closed feudal country under the Tokugawa shogunate when U.S. naval officer Matthew Perry arrived on July 8, 1853, demanding Japan to open its ports to American trade. Japan had been practicing a policy of sakoku鎖国 (closed country) for over two centuries, allowing only limited trade with the Dutch and Chinese. Perry’s arrival, backed by a show of military force under "gunboat diplomacy," revealed to Japan the overwhelming technological and military power of Western nations, which it was ill-prepared to resist.[1]
As the forced opening of Japan exposed the weaknesses in the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai from the Choshu and Satsuma domains led a movement that overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate and restored the emperor to power by 1868. This ended the 250 years of military rule.[2] 
With Emperor Meiji restored to power, the Meiji Restoration began in Japan. Although they installed Emperor Meiji, the power came from a group of samurai leaders from the Satsuma and Choshu domains. The Meiji government pursued rapid modernization, borrowing ideas and systems from the West to transform Japan’s economy, military, and social structure. This period saw the abolition of the feudal system, industrialization, and the establishment of a centralized government. Japan adopted Western technology and organizational models in various fields, including a new army based on the Prussian model and a navy modeled after the British.[3]
As Japan modernized, its military ambition grew. By the 1890s, Japan’s modernized military was capable of competing with Western powers. In the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), Japan defeated China, gaining Taiwan and establishing influence over Korea. This victory demonstrated Japan’s newfound strength and marked its emergence as an imperial power. Although Japan was already powerful in the East, it knew it could not continue to grow without help from the West through diplomatic relationships. [4]
Kentaro Kaneko was a Japanese diplomat, Harvard-educated, and a key political advisor to Japanese Prime Minister Katsura Taro. He was a trusted representative for Japan and a familiar figure in American circles due to his education and connections. Through his diplomatic efforts, he got President Theodore Roosevelt to assist Japan’s war with Russia.
President Roosevelt played a behind-the-scenes role in assisting Japan; one of the most notable ways he did this was by helping Japan secure funding from American financial circles to sustain its war effort against Russia, which was straining Japan’s resources. Jacob Schiff, the president of the Kuhn, Loeb & Co. Bank, and his firm played a critical role in securing funds for Japan. Throughout the Russo-Japanese War, Kuhn, Loeb & Co., under Schiff’s direction, loaned Japan around $200 million (equivalent to billions today). This support was essential in keeping Japan financially stable through the war.[5]
Schiff’s involvement was not solely for profit but also politically motivated. Schiff, a Jewish banker, opposed Russia’s oppressive treatment of Jewish populations and saw Japan’s success as a potential blow to Russian power. Schiff’s financing gave Japan the funds needed to purchase weapons, supplies, and cover the costs of military operations.

The Russo-Japanese War and the U.S. as a Mediator (1904-1905)
The Russo-Japanese War marked a turning point in U.S. involvement in East Asia. Japan’s ambitions to expand its influence over Korea and Manchuria brought the country into conflict with Russia, a regional power with similar aspirations. U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt saw the conflict as an opportunity for the United States to play a mediating role on the national stage, and he was eager to help his friend, Kaneko. The Treaty of Portsmouth, brokered by Roosevelt in 1905, effectively ended the war and led to Japan’s recognition as a major player in the region. 
The success of the Treaty of Portsmouth not only earned Roosevelt the Nobel Peace Prize but also cemented the U.S. as an influential arbiter in Asia. The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed in 1905, ended the Russo-Japanese War and resulted in significant territorial gains for Japan, though it did not directly colonize new lands. It recognized Japan’s "paramount political, military, and economic interest" in Korea, setting the stage for Japan’s formal annexation of Korea in 1910. Japan also gained the southern half of Sakhalin Island from Russia and control over the strategic Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula, which gave Japan vital naval and military bases. Additionally, Japan secured control over the South Manchurian Railway and gained significant economic privileges in southern Manchuria. While the treaty did not involve direct colonization of these areas, it greatly expanded Japan's imperial reach and influence in East Asia, paving the way for its future territorial ambitions in Korea and China.[6]
Taft-Katsura Agreement and the Root-Takahira Agreement: Recognizing Spheres of InfluenceThe U.S. was concerned with preserving its interests in East Asia, particularly regarding the Open Door Policy in China, which advocated for equal trade access and opposed exclusive control by any single power. In 1905, the Taft-Katsura Agreement (although not formalized as a treaty) tacitly acknowledged Japanese dominance in Korea in exchange for Japan’s recognition of U.S. control in the Philippines. This informal understanding marked a significant shift: the U.S. was willing to accept Japan’s ambitions in Korea to ensure stability.
The Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 further solidified this arrangement. Both nations agreed to respect each other’s territorial holdings in the Pacific and uphold the Open Door Policy in China. While these agreements maintained a semblance of peace, they also reinforced Japan’s growing sphere of influence, allowing Japan to solidify its control over Korea and parts of Manchuria without U.S. opposition.[7]
The Washington Naval Conference and a Fragile Peace (1921-1922)Although President Theodore Roosevelt initially supported Japan's expansionist policy, viewing Japan as a counterbalance to Russian influence in East Asia, he was cautious about the extent of Japan’s ambitions. Roosevelt's support included tacitly accepting Japan’s control over Korea through the Taft-Katsura Memorandum in 1905 and brokering the Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended the Russo-Japanese War and granted Japan significant influence in the region.
However, as Japan's power continued to grow and its influence expanded further into China, U.S. officials became increasingly wary. Roosevelt did not advocate for a "Japanese Monroe Doctrine" encompassing the entire Pacific and preferred a balanced approach rather than encouraging Japan's unrestrained dominance. The shift in U.S. policy to limit Japan’s ambitions became more pronounced under subsequent presidents, especially William Howard Taft, who sought to check Japan’s influence in the Pacific.
This cautious stance was later reinforced under President Warren G. Harding in the post-World War I period. The United States and its allies feared an arms race in the Pacific. To address these concerns, the U.S. hosted the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-1922, which aimed to limit naval capabilities among the world’s major powers. The resulting treaties—such as the Five-Power Treaty—imposed limits on battleship tonnage and restricted the construction of naval bases in the Pacific, creating a balance of power that theoretically reduced the chance of armed conflict.[8]
However, while the Washington Naval Conference curbed military expansion, it did not address Japan’s ambitions on the Asian continent, particularly in China. Japan viewed itself as a protector of stability in Asia, often in opposition to Western colonial interests, and believed it had the right to establish its sphere of influence. Although the U.S. hoped to maintain peace and stability, the agreements of the 1920s were ultimately inadequate in addressing the broader regional tensions.
The Mukden Incident and the Occupation of Manchuria (1931)The relative peace established by the Washington Naval Conference was shattered in 1931 when the Mukden Incident, a staged event, provided Japan with a pretext to occupy Manchuria. The Mukden Incident occurred on September 18, 1931, and was set off by a planned explosion along a section of the South Manchurian Railway near the city of Mukden (now Shenyang) in northeastern China. Japanese officers from the Kwantung Army, stationed in Manchuria to protect Japanese interests in the railway, orchestrated the explosion as a pretext for military intervention. They accused Chinese forces of sabotaging the railway, although the explosion caused minimal damage and did not disrupt train service. This fabricated incident provided Japan with a justification to launch a full-scale invasion of Manchuria, claiming the need to protect its investments and Japanese citizens.
The Kwantung Army swiftly moved to occupy major cities across Manchuria, facing little resistance from Chinese forces. The Japanese government, while not directly authorizing the incident, did little to stop the army's actions. Within a few months, Japan established the puppet state of Manchukuo in Manchuria with former Chinese emperor Puyi as a nominal ruler. The Mukden Incident marked a turning point in Japanese aggression, setting Japan on a path of expansionism in Asia and contributing to rising tensions that would lead to the Second Sino-Japanese War and eventually World War II.
Japan quickly established a puppet state, Manchukuo, marking a clear violation of Chinese sovereignty and U.S. policy principles. The U.S. responded with the Stimson Doctrine, a policy that declared non-recognition of territorial acquisitions achieved through force. Secretary of State Henry Stimson, who served under President Herbert Hoover, asserted that the U.S. would not recognize any changes to China's sovereignty that resulted from Japan’s aggression.[9] 
While the Stimson Doctrine signaled U.S. disapproval, it lacked enforcement power and did not deter Japan’s expansionist ambitions. The League of Nations also condemned the occupation but Japan ultimately withdrew from the organization rather than relinquish control of Manchuria. This was a turning point, highlighting the limits of diplomatic pressure without military or economic enforcement mechanisms.
Conclusion: The U.S. Approach to East Asia Before World War IIBetween the Russo-Japanese War and the occupation of Manchuria, U.S. policy evolved from proactive diplomacy to a more restrained and idealistic stance that favored principles like the Open Door Policy and non-recognition of aggression. However, the limitations of this became evident as Japan's expansion continued unchecked.
This period underscores the complexities of maintaining influence without direct intervention. The U.S.’s hope for stability in East Asia ultimately faced challenges that its policy tools—diplomacy, treaties, and statements of principle—could not fully address and are often inconsistent. The events leading up to World War II in the Pacific prompted a re-evaluation of America’s role in the region with lasting implications for United States-Asia relations.

Sources: 

1. Office of the Historian. "The Opening to Japan: Commodore Perry and Japan (1853-1854)." U.S. Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/opening-to-japan. Accessed November 9th, 2024.
   
2. Asia for Educators. "Japan and the West: The Meiji Restoration (1868-1912)." Columbia University, https://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1750_meiji.htm. Accessed November 9th, 2024.
   
3. Totman, Conrad. "The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862–1868." Japan Before Perry: A Short History, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 209-235. https://academic.oup.com/book/32352/chapter/268612619.
   
4. Schmid, Andre. "Colonialism and the 'Korea Problem' in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article." International Journal of Korean History, vol. 17, no. 1, 2012, pp. 1-26. https://ijkh.khistory.org/upload/pdf/17-1-1.pdf.
   
5. Huen, Ian. "The Arrow War: Being British in East Asia." CUHK Alumni, 2015, https://www.alumni.cuhk.edu.hk/aahcp/Article%202015%20-%205563-IanHuen.pdf.
   
6. Office of the Historian. "The Treaty of Portsmouth and the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905." U.S. Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/portsmouth-treaty. Accessed November 9, 2024.
   
7. Office of the Historian. "Japanese-American Relations at the Turn of the Century, 1900–1922." U.S. Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/japanese-relations. Accessed November 8,2024.
   
8. U.S. Army. "Military Intelligence: This Week in History, Nov. 1921." U.S. Army, 7 Nov. 2012, https://www.army.mil/article/90896/military_intelligence_this_week_in_history_nov_1921.
   
   ​9. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. "The Mukden Incident, 1931." Milestones: 1921–1936, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/mukden-incident. Accessed November 10, 2024.
   

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