Prelude to Operation Ichigo: Factors that Limited China's Resistance Effort

by Jillian Carrillo

The Japanese launched Operation Ichigo on April 19, 1944, with two primary goals: the destruction of allied airfields in Southern China and the establishment of land communications to the Southern Army through French Indo-China (Sherry et al. 16).[1] The destruction of Allied airfields enhanced Japanese military strategy and allowed them further control within China. The overland supply route relieved pressure off the Japanese empire’s maritime trade routes, which were faced with constant Allied submarine attacks (Sherry et al. 16).[2] Both the Chinese Nationalist government and the United States put up fierce resistance against Operation Ichigo. However, their success was limited by the polarization of Chinese society, poor organization and training of the Chinese military, and strategic disputes between Chiang Kai-shek (the leader of the KMT) and General Stilwell (the American representative in China). This blog post will examine these three factors to provide context for obstacles that arose during Operation Ichigo and ultimately limited the success of the Chinese Nationalist Government and the United States.

Conflict over power in China began much earlier than World War II. From 1927 to 1937, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were fighting for power in China. The Kuomintang was led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist Party was led by Mao Zedong. Despite their many political and ideological differences, the two parties were forced to join together to effectively fight off the Japanese invasion and occupation during the Second Sino-Japanese War. This temporary alliance is referred to as the Second United Front.

This alliance was fraught from the beginning. Rather than focusing their energy on forming a true military alliance, the two parties controlled different parts of China and focused their respective resources in those areas (Maroulis, PAE).[3] The Kuomintang was based in Chungking whereas the CCP was based 500 miles north of Chungking in Yenan (Kraus et al. 4). Officially, the Kuomintang was the ruling party of China during World War II, which meant that the United States aided their efforts. The United States assisted China through the Lend-Lease Act, which allowed the U.S. to lease war supplies to any nation deemed vital to the defense of the United States (National Archives).[4] The U.S. provided air and logistical support, military advice, and technical support (Kraus et al. 3).[5] In contrast, the CCP relied heavily on guerilla tactics against the Japanese in the areas that they controlled (Maroulis, PAE).[6] Their different strategies, as well as their control over different areas of China, caused China’s response to the Japanese invasion to be rather fractured in nature. This delicate alliance between two opposing groups hampered China’s ability to effectively fight against the Japanese.

Map of China with districts under Communist control labeled. Map: ‘Areas of Communist Activity in China’ from Harrison Forman: ‘Report from Red China’, June 1945. Catalogue ref: WO 208/4398

Report created by the Japanese military in order to distinguish CCP guerillas from civilians. Report entitled ‘METHODS OF DISTINGUISHING GUERRILLAS FROM CIVILIANS’ by the Japanese Army captured and translated by the US Army’s Pacific Military Intelligence Research (PACMIR). 1943-45. Catalogue ref: WO 208/4398

The Kuomintang’s resistance effort was also limited by poor organization and training of their military forces. Although Chiang Kai-shek’s army consisted of 3.8 million men in 1941, it mostly consisted of poorly trained and ill-equipped troops (Kraus et al. 4). Many lacked the proper clothing and it was not uncommon for troops to suffer from malnutrition (Kraus et al. 4). Additionally, few soldiers were loyal to Chiang Kai-shek (Kraus et al. 7). The majority pledged their loyalty to their unit commanders, contributing to a fractured military response on the part of the KMT. Perhaps most importantly, the Kuomintang’s resistance effort was limited by their tactics: the majority of the Nationalist Army prioritized defense, choosing to conserve manpower and equipment over mounting offensives against the Japanese (Sherry et al. 7).
Additionally, rather than focusing on the threat posed by the Japanese, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were preoccupied with concerns about the CCP and their movements within China (Jahnke, 25).[7] Chiang Kai-shek held much of his army in reserve to use against the communists once World War II ended (Kraus et al. 4).[8] This not only hindered the Kuomintang’s resistance efforts against the Japanese but also led to a challenging relationship with the United States throughout World War II. Throughout the war, the United States sent aid to the Kuomintang, however, it quickly became apparent that the United States and the Kuomintang shared different political and strategic objectives (Jahnke, 26).[9] While the United States had intended their aid to be used as a means to bolster the Nationalist Army, Chiang Kai-shek siphoned much of that aid off for future use against the communists (Jahnke, 26).[10] Disputes between the United States and the Kuomintang did not end there: Chiang Kai-shek’s and General Stilwell’s opposing views on the defense and liberation of Burma continued to clash.

Chiang Kai-shek (left) and Mao Zedong (right) at the Chongqing negotiations. Source: Public Domain

General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell Source: Public Domain

Japanese forces had overrun Burma by April 1942, which meant that China was now isolated from the rest of the world and relied solely on military and economic aid supplied by the United States (Kuo et al).[11] Stilwell largely blamed Chiang Kai-shek for this defeat, arguing that the Nationalist Army had incompetent commanders and poor military leadership (Kuo et al).[12] This put a strain on their relationship and the two continued to disagree on military strategy. In the spring of 1943, neither could agree on a strategy to liberate Burma from Japanese rule or the proper use of American airpower. Chiang Kai-shek wanted to liberate all of Burma whereas General Stilwell focused his energy on solely liberating Upper Burma (Kuo et al).[13] Stilwell also responded to Kai-shek’s request for more American airpower by suggesting that he ask communist forces to join the Nationalist Army in their fight against the Japanese (Kuo et al).[14] However, this only further angered Chiang Kai-shek. The leader of the KMT refused to seek help from the Chinese Communist Party, despite the request of an American General partner. This decision exemplifies the complex and delicate relationship between the three aforementioned historical actors. It also highlights the political fractures faced by China as they attempted to create a united front against Japan.

Japanese Conquest of Burma. Source: U.S. Army Center of Military History

Stilwell marches out of Burma, May 1942. Source: Public Domain

Although the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party had ceased fighting and formed a temporary alliance to team together to fight against Japan, splinters in this alliance prevented China from adequately resisting Japan’s invasion efforts. For example, Kai-shek insisted that several of his best units should be deployed to northwestern China to blockade the CCP in Yenan (Sherry et al. 7). Stilwell claimed that almost 500,000 Nationalist troops were preoccupied with this China vs China fight rather than defending China from the Japanese (Sherry et al. 15). The KMT continually failed to organize themselves to mount strategic offensives and instead chose to allocate their resources towards fighting the communists. Not only did this allow Japan to secure their hold within China but the Japanese were also allowed to use China as a means to extend their military aggression. Beginning in December of 1943, five Japanese infantry divisions left China for the Pacific islands (Sherry et al. 15). Finally, even though the United States provided both economic and military aid to China, differing opinions on how those resources should be used to combat Japan hampered the United States and China’s efforts to resist Japanese advancements. These issues resurfaced once Japan launched Operation Ichigo, which posed a significant challenge to Chinese and U.S. forces.

Sources: 
1. Mark D. Sherry, U.S. Army Center of Military History, and John W. Mountcastle, “China Defensive 4 July 1942–4 May 1945,” n.d., https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-38/CMH_Pub_72-38.pdf.
2. Sherry, U.S. Army Center of Military History, and Mountcastle, “China Defensive 4 July 1942–4 May 1945.”
3. “The Second United Front: A KMT and CCP Alliance in Name, but Not in Practice,” Pacific Atrocities Education, n.d., https://www.pacificatrocities.org/blog/the-second-united-front-a-kmt-and-ccp-alliance-in-name-but-not-in-practice.
4. “Lend-Lease Act (1941),” National Archives, June 28, 2022, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/lend-lease-act.
5. Theresa L. Kraus and JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE, “China Offensive 5 May–2 September 1945,” report, May 5, 1945, https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-39/CMH_Pub_72-39.pdf.
6. “The Second United Front: A KMT and CCP Alliance in Name, but Not in Practice.”
7. Todd Eric Janhke. "By Air Power Alone: America's Strategic Air War in China, 1941–1945." Order No. 1409836, University of North Texas, 2001. https://stmarys-ca.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/air-power-alone-americas-strategic-war-china-1941/docview/304714150/se-2.
8. Kraus and JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE, “China Offensive 5 May–2 September 1945.”
9. Todd Eric Janhke. "By Air Power Alone: America's Strategic Air War in China, 1941–1945." Order No. 1409836, University of North Texas, 2001.
10. Todd Eric Janhke. "By Air Power Alone: America's Strategic Air War in China, 1941–1945." Order No. 1409836, University of North Texas, 2001.
11.  “Vinegar Joe and the Generalissimo.” https://www.hoover.org/research/vinegar-joe-and-generalissimo.
12. Ibid
13. Ibid
14. Ibid