by Jenny Chan By the end of World War 2, after Japan surrendered, Kishi Nobusuke was arrested by Allied forces as a Class A war crimes suspect and detained in the Sugamo Prison for three years. However, he was never formally charged, tried, or convicted. He was released from custody in 1948 as political priorities shifted during the Cold War in the United States. In the years following his release, Kishi was prohibited from participating in political activity until 1952. Despite his wartime record, Kishi later reemerged as a significant political figure in postwar Japan, eventually becoming prime minister in 1957.[Central Intelligence Agency] Kishi's economic policies were a key component of Japan's total war strategy, as the empire sought to expand its influence throughout Asia through military conquest and economic control. After he graduated with top honors from Tokyo Imperial University in 1920, he became a clerk in the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. By the time Japan occupied Manchuria, declaring it Manchukuo, Kishi had become one of the senior officials involved in the industrial development of Manchukuo. During his tenure as Vice Minister of Industry and Commerce in Manchukuo, he was directly involved in the planning and administration of Japan's economic exploitation of the region. Under his leadership, the manufacturing sector of Manchukuo grew at roughly 9.9% per year. In Manchukuo, Kishi helped oversee large-scale industrial projects, including the development of mines, railroads, and munitions factories to make the industries in Manchukuo profitable for large Japanese business conglomerates (zaibatsu). These industries were staffed by Chinese civilians, many of whom were forcibly conscripted to work under inhumane conditions. Workers were subjected to extreme physical demands, often with minimal or no pay, inadequate food, and unsanitary living conditions. The forced laborers faced harsh treatment, and many perished from overwork, malnutrition, and lack of medical care. It was estimated that 4 million Chinese were used as forced labor, and 40% died. [Heilbrunn] Kishi's personal views on the Chinese were profoundly racist, as reflected in his statement: "We Japanese are like pure water in a bucket; different from the Chinese who are like the filthy Yangtze river. But be careful. If even the smallest amount of shit gets into our bucket, we become totally polluted. Since all the toilets in China empty into the Yangtze, the Chinese are soiled forever. We, however, must maintain our purity." [Driscoll, 303] The economic success that Kishi achieved in Manchukuo came at the severe human cost of forced labor, which helped fuel Japan's war machine during the early stages of its expansion. Kishi earned a reputation for being a ruthless and efficient administrator, sometimes referred to as the "Monster of Showa." His labor exploitation in Manchukuo became a model for Japan's wartime industrial planning. In 1939, Kishi returned to Japan and took on more significant roles in the central government. During World War II, Kishi served as Vice Minister of Commerce and Industry (1941–1943) and later as the Minister of Commerce and Industry (1943–1944). As a cabinet member in Tojo's cabinet, he voted to declare war on the United States and Britain on December 1. On December 7, 1941, he signed the declaration of war to order the attack on Pearl Harbor. Kishi's involvement with forced labor didn't end with his time in Manchukuo. During his tenure as Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Japanese government, Kishi extended these practices to Japan and its occupied territories during the Pacific War. His policies were central to Japan's exploitation of labor from Korea, China, and other parts of its empire.
Alignment with Militarists Post-War Arrest as a Suspected War Criminal Following Japan's surrender in 1945, Kishi was arrested by Allied forces and held in Sugamo Prison as a Class A war crimes suspect. The charge: Class A war crimes – crimes against peace, including conspiring to wage an aggressive war. His involvement in Japan's wartime government, particularly his role in Manchukuo and his use of forced labor, made him a prime target for investigation. However, Kishi was never prosecuted, and he was released from custody in 1948 as political priorities shifted during the Cold War. Shifting Geopolitical Context: The Cold War's Influence The decision to release Kishi, along with other detained figures, cannot be fully understood without considering the geopolitical context of the late 1940s. By the time the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal had prosecuted Japan's top military and political leaders, the political landscape was rapidly changing. The Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was taking shape, and Japan was seen as a potential ally in the battle against communism . U.S. policymakers, led by General Douglas MacArthur, who governed Japan during the occupation, began to reconsider the harsh approach of purging Japan's wartime leadership. As Japan's economy was in ruins and its political stability in question, experienced leaders like Kishi—despite their wartime roles—were viewed as essential to rebuilding the nation. In this shifting climate, Kishi was released from Sugamo Prison in 1948, along with other suspected war criminals, as part of a broader effort to stabilize Japan and counter growing communist influence in Asia. The U.S. needed a strong, economically viable Japan as a bulwark against the spread of communism, particularly as tensions escalated in China and Korea. [White House Memo] A Controversial Legacy Kishi Nobusuke's legacy remains deeply controversial. On one hand, his contributions to Japan's postwar recovery and Cold War diplomacy are significant. On the other, his wartime record—particularly his involvement in Japan's brutal occupation policies and reliance on forced labor in Manchukuo—casts a long shadow over his career. His detention in Sugamo Prison without trial is often seen as an example of the compromises made during Japan's transition from a wartime aggressor to a Cold War ally. It illustrates the complicated nature of postwar justice, where political expediency sometimes outweighed the pursuit of accountability for wartime atrocities. Sources: Central Intelligence Agency. Kishi, Nobusuke. CIA Reading Room, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/KISHI%2C%20NOBUSUKE_0002.pdf. Accessed October 4, 2024. Heilbrunn, Jacob. "The Works of the Monster of Shōwa." Palladium, June 3 2022, https://www.palladiummag.com/2022/06/03/the-works-of-the-monster-of-showa/. Accessed October 3, 2024. Driscoll, Mark. Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque: The Living, Dead, and Undead in Japan's Imperialism, 1895–1945. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010. Kurzman, Dan. Kishi and Japan: The Search for the Sun. Ivan Obolensky, 1960. "Japan: How Could a Wartime Leader's Grandson Become Its Longest-Serving Prime Minister?" BBC News, March 8 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64858944. Accessed October 4, 2024. CIC Intelligence Summary, "Kodama (War Criminal)," NA, RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, box 1178, folder: Kodama, Yoshio. "Memorandum of a Conversation, Tokyo, November 19, 1956." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Japan, Volume 23, Part 1, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v23p1/d183. Accessed October 3, 2024. Read More:
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