Japan's Push South- Operation Ichigo's Impact on China's Resistance

by Jillian Carrillo

When the Japanese launched Operation Ichigo on April 19th, 1944, they pursued two primary goals: to destroy the Allied airfields in Southern China and to establish a land communications route to the Southern Army through French Indo-China. The constant threat of an attack on Japan through the airfields in Southern China and persistent attacks on transportation routes between Japan and the Southern Army made this operation necessary to secure Japan’s position in the Pacific Theater. This blog post will examine the strategies and outcomes of the Japanese plan to destroy the Allied airfields in Southern China.

Map Illustrating the path of the Japanese throughout Operation Ichigo. Map courtesy of the United States Military Academy Department of History

To hide Operation Ichigo’s true goals, Japan first attempted to deceive Chinese and American forces by launching Operation Go-Go (DTIC, 29).[1] The Southern Army conducted itself in a manner that indicated to Allied forces that an operation in the Kunming area was being considered (DTIC, 29).[2] This drew their attention away from Operation Ichigo’s primary targets. However, despite Japan’s attempts to keep Operation Ichigo a secret from Chinese and American forces, their plans were known to the Allied forces (DTIC, 29).[3]
Operation Ichigo was divided into three phases and each one involved the capture of at least one Allied airfield. Japanese troops consisted of the 11th Army, the Wuchang-Hankou Defense Army, and the 5th Air Army. The 11th Army was made up of the 3rd, 13th, 27th, 34th, 40th, 58th, 68th, and 116th Divisions, as well as part of the Wuchang-Hankou Defense Army (DTIC, 32).[4] The Wuchang-Hankou Defense Army consisted of the 39th Division, the 17th Independent Mixed Brigade, the 5th, 7th, 11th, and 12th Independent Infantry Brigades, and the 5th, 9th, and 10th Field Replacement Units. The 5th Air Army was the main force utilized (DTIC, 32).[5] The Japanese also kept several divisions on standby to attach to the 11th Army if necessary (DTIC, 32).[6]

Chart Illustrating the Strength of the Japanese Military during Operation Ichigo. Photo: DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945

Phase one sought to capture Changsha and Hengyang. The Japanese first attacked and occupied Changsha before marching to Hengyang. Hengyang was a vital target as a strategic hub on the Canton-Hankow Railroad, crucial for controlling the movement of troops and supplies between southern and central China. It was also home to the largest Fourteenth Air Force base in Hunan Province, making it a key point for Allied air operations and a significant objective for the Japanese during Operation Ichigo. (Bell, 42).[7] On May 27th, 1944, the Japanese 11th Army began their march towards Hengyang (Bell, 42).[8] The 11th Army was ordered to use the majority of its strength against the Chinese 9th War Sector Army (DTIC, 32).[9] Their secondary targets were Allied forces to the west of the Hsiang Chiang (Xiang River), a major waterway in southern China that served as a critical transportation and supply route. Control of the Xiang River region was strategically significant, as it provided access to key logistical pathways and influenced the movement of troops and resources during the campaign (DTIC, 43).[10] The 11th Army faced little resistance as it advanced along the rail line until it reached the outskirts of Hengyang. 
Hengyang was defended by the Nationalist Chinese Tenth Army under the command of General Fang Hsien Chueh and the Fourteenth Air Force (Bell, 42).[11] The Allied defense, coupled with difficulties in supplying the Japanese forces, led to a two-month stalemate in the Japanese advance. Brig. General Clinton D. Vincent’s 68th Composite Wing forced Japanese soldiers to take cover during the day due to constant attacks on Japanese troops (Bell, 42).[12] At night, airmen attacked Japanese motor transport halting almost all supply activities (Bell, 42).[13] The Japanese cited several reasons for their unsuccessful attempts to capture Hengyang: difficult terrain, strong enemy positions, enemy determination to resist, shortage of ammunition, and superior enemy air strength (DTIC, 84).[14] Despite the resistance put up by the Tenth Army, they failed to take advantage of several opportunities to attack Japanese lines of communications that had been made vulnerable by the Fourteenth Air Force’s attacks (Bell, 42).[15] The city and airfield of Hengyang fell on August 8th, 1944.

Map that Illustrates the Attack on Hengyang. Photo: DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945

The second phase of the operation sought to capture the airfields at Kweilin and Liuchowsien. Troops for the second phase consisted of the 11th Army and the 23rd Army. The 23rd was composed of the 22nd and 104th Divisions, as well as the 22nd and 23rd Independent Mixed Brigades (DTIC, 34).[16] The 11th Army departed from Hengyang, marching along the Hunan-Kwangsi railway, while the 23rd Army advanced from the area along the banks of the Hsiang Chiang and the Luichow Peninsula (DTIC, 33).[17]
The Japanese advance during this phase of the operation was largely limited by logistical difficulties. For example, the Fourteenth Air Force persistently attacked Japanese supply lines, which slowed their advance (Bell, 42).[18] However, despite their best efforts, the relentless Japanese advance forced the American and Chinese troops to make a quick decision about how they wanted to defend the major airfields near Kweilin (Bell, 42).[19] General Stilwell, the American Chief of Staff for Chiang Kai Shek, chose to bury and detonate bombs in the runways to render the airfields useless (Bell, 42).[20] However, Stilwell kept one airfield open in Kweilin to bring in additional troops to aid the fight against the Japanese advance (Bell, 43).[21] Despite their attempts to halt the Japanese advance, both Kweilin and Liuchow were captured on November 11th, 1944 (Kraus et al. 8).[22] Only the airfield at Nanning remained as a combat base by the end of September (Bell, 43).[23]

The third phase of Operation Ichigo sought to capture the air base at Nanning. By capturing Nanning, the Japanese would not only be able to prevent an attack on Japan but also would be able to establish a line of communication with the Southern Army. Portions of the 23rd Army were sent to capture Nanning, while the 11th Army occupied vital points along the Canton-Hankou railway in order to reopen the route (DTIC, 34).[24] Another part of the 11th Army was sent to capture the airfields at Suichwan and Nanhsiung (DTIC, 34). Nanning fell on November 24th, 1944.[25]
Operation Ichigo was a victory for the Japanese because they had succeeded in capturing major airfields in Southern China. This forced the Fourteenth Air Force to move 400 miles to the west in order to continue their operations and prevent any potential B-29 bombers from leaving China to attack Japan (Bell, 43).[26] However, the success of Operation Ichigo yielded mixed results for Japan’s overall military agenda. The capture of airfields in Southern China only spurred the creation of new airfields to quickly replace those that had been lost to the Japanese (Bell, 43).[27] Although their impact had temporarily decreased due to Operation Ichigo, American forces relocated several airfields farther to the west, allowing B-29 offensives to continue (Sherry et al. 21).[28] Operation Ichigo also overextended the Japanese, ultimately forcing many of their troops to pull back from territory they had conquered during the operation (Bell, 44).[29] As a result, although Operation Ichigo had successfully accomplished its goal of capturing key airfields, the operation did not create lasting security for Japan.

To learn more: 

Sources:
1. DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945: https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA640839/page/13/mode/1up
2. DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945
3. DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945
4. DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945
5. DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945
6. DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945
7. Raymond E. Bell, “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II,” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 42.
8. Raymond E. Bell, “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II,” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 42.
9. DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945
10. DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945
11. Raymond E. Bell, “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II,” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 42.
12. Raymond E. Bell, “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II,” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 42.
13. Raymond E. Bell, “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II,” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 42.
14. DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945
15. Raymond E. Bell, “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II,” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 42.
16. DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945
17. DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945
18. Raymond E. Bell, “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II,” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 42.
19. Raymond E. Bell, “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II,” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 42.
20. Raymond E. Bell, “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II,” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 42.
21. Raymond E. Bell, “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II,” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 43.
22. Kraus and JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE, “China Offensive 5 May–2 September 1945.”
23. Raymond E. Bell, “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II,” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 43.
24. DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945
25. DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945
26. Raymond E. Bell, “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II,” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 43.
27. Raymond E. Bell, “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II,” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 43.
28. Sherry, U.S. Army Center of Military History, and Mountcastle, “China Defensive 4 July 1942–4 May 1945.”
​29. Raymond E. Bell, “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II,” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 44.

Works Cited
Bell, Raymond E. “With Hammers & Wicker Baskets: The Construction of U.S. Army Airfields in China During World War II.” Army History, no. 93 (2014): 30–54. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26300287.

DTIC ADA640839: Army Operations in China. January 1944 - August 1945: 
https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA640839/page/13/mode/1up

Kraus, Theresa L. and JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE. “China Offensive 5 May–2 September 1945.” Report, May 5, 1945. https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-39/CMH_Pub_72-39.pdf.
Sherry, Mark D., U.S. Army Center of Military History, and John W. Mountcastle. “China Defensive 4 July 1942–4 May 1945,” n.d. https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-38/CMH_Pub_72-38.pdf.

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