Destruction of a City: Battle of Manila

by Isaac Bly

The atrocities, crimes, and massacres mentioned in this essay are not exhaustive; no single account can encompass every horror, known or unknown. Instead, this essay seeks to illustrate the experience of living and dying in Manila during those fateful days.

When Japanese forces had hundreds of units across the Asia-Pacific following the attack on Pearl Harbor, they swiftly occupied Manila following the invasion of Luzon, right on the heels of General MacArthur. For four bitter years, the Japanese had ruled the Philippines under their puppet government as a part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, no longer burdened by American imperialism.[1] However, the Allies’ return to Manila was not a triumph but rather a nightmare and one often forgotten despite its scale. An accurate assessment of the total civilian deaths for such a chaotic urban battle intertwined with a campaign of execution and violence is highly unlikely. The most commonly cited total claims that 100,000 civilians died due to Japanese atrocities, American artillery, or deprivation, a total deserving much scrutiny.[2]

The Massacre of Manila
The first American forces into Manila were the ad-hoc columns of the 1st Cavalry’s “flying column” advancing deep into enemy lines, they raced for Santo Tomas, Malacanang palace, and the Legislative building.[3] Inside Santo Tomas were 3,700 Allied internees, many of whom had been imprisoned since 1942.[4]  Approximately 68 US Army nurses who had held out on Corregidor were now working to keep the beleaguered population alive.[5] Food rations had dwindled steadily for nearly a year, with the average prisoner surviving on about 800 calories a day.[6] Late on the 3rd of February 1945, elements of the American 8th Cavalry Regiment and their Filipino guides commanded by Captain Manuel Colayco broke into Santo Tomas with Battlin’ Basic being the first tank through the gates facing limited resistance.[7] A small holdout under Lieutenant Colonel Toshio Hayashi held hostage 275 prisoners in the Education Building until safe passage was arranged for the Japanese on the 4th of February, 1945.[8] The warehouses that had been kept to maintain the garrison were demolished while the northern districts like Tondo were consumed with flames while Japanese forces gunned down civilians who left their homes.[9] After taking Malacanang Palace without resistance, the American Cavalrymen of Troop F found none of the Allied prisoners they had expected, the “flying column” retired, and the legislative building far out of sight.[10] In the words of a sixteen-year-old Filipino diarist, Lourdes Reyes, gazing out at Manila Bay, “[...] towards the north where the sound came from, the sky glowed the same vermilion. Thick clouds of smoke blew up against the clear night—higher and higher.”[11] At the Dy Pac lumber yard in Tondo, the Japanese gathered up the civilians of the neighborhood (men, women, and children), divided them by gender, and lined them up before beheading and bayonetting them, claiming some 115 dead in one bloody massacre.[12] Seemingly based on suspected disloyalty.[13] One of the four survivors was 25-year-old Richardo San Juan who survived the initial executions with injuries.[14] He had witnessed the slaughter of his pregnant wife Virginia and their three children.[15]

Japanese forces had effectively destroyed every bridge crossing the Pasig by the 4th of February, and buildings already mined were demolished.[16] While most Japanese forces withdrew south, many remained in the north, adding to the chaos as Filipino civilians attempted to survive the unfolding battle. On the morning of February 4th, 1945 at Tondo church, Father Paul de Guzman and two other priests held mass for the stragglers who had ducked inside to avoid being shot.[17] Meanwhile, Japanese forces manned the field guns they had placed the previous night at the front steps of the church.[18] The same day, the Ermita and Binondo districts were put to the torch as Japanese troops began round-ups of Intramuros residents, the men were sent to Fort Santiago, and the women and children to San Agustin Church.[19]

In the early afternoon of the 5th of February 1945, a Japanese squad established guards at the entrance of the Tondo Church where Father Paul de Guzman and his fellow survivors, allowed civilians to enter but not to leave.[20] Soon after, the Japanese artillery at the church started to fire eastwards until it was identified by a US spotter plane and destroyed by counterbattery, some 15 rounds hit the church before the gun was silenced.[21] Inside Intramuros, the round-ups continued, and attempts to exit the walled city were blocked, across the city, Japanese soldiers preyed on young women, plucking them from the throngs of refugees and sexually assaulting them.[22] Elsewhere, Allied forces made slow progress in all directions as new plans were drawn up. The reality of a Japanese defense was clear. Constant explosions and fierce fires inhibited planning progress while Japanese incendiary squads laid waste to banks, music stores, businesses, and pharmacies; Manila’s Fifth Avenue turned to dust.[23] While the Cavalry wheeled out east, elements of the 148th Infantry occupied Bilibid, followed by a cheering crowd of Filipinos.[24] The prison had been handed over to the internees as Japanese forces withdrew despite preparations for defense.[25]
On the 6th of February, 1945, American theatre commander General Douglas MacArthur announced to the world that Manila had fallen at 6:30 AM.[26] By that morning, the fire had progressed and the Japanese pulled out such that the thousands trapped in Plaza Moriones and Tondo Church began to flee.[27] Father Paul de Guzman’s group was driven back by grenades by stragglers, one of the groups that did escape included parish priest Monsignor Jose Jovellanos, who was attacked by Japanese forces in the public school before making their crossing over the Pritil estero* and to the Santa Monica chapel in American lines.[28] Similarly, at St. Teresa College, the civilians inside were prevented from leaving while Japanese positioned guns fired and received fire.[29] The nightmare for those trapped inside Intramuros began to take shape as captives were robbed and then confined in smaller groups and tightly packed into dungeons with no provisions as their captors began their executions, dragging them out to be disposed of via bayonet.[30] 

As the 37th Infantry made their first crossing of the Pasig on the 7th of February 1945, the 1st Cavalry moved for the Paco Railroad station, discovering the massacre at Dy Pac. A notebook from a member of the 9th Shipping Engineer Regiment (an Army unit located in Intramuros) records: “February 7 1945. One hundred and fifty guerillas were disposed of tonight. I personally stabbed and killed 10.”[31] Until the 7th, US artillery had been restricted to known enemy positions and counterbattery fire, in the face of mounting casualties and Japanese arson and artillery, subsequently, any structure providing resistance was subject to artillery, except specific buildings known to contain civilians.[32]
Having established a foothold south of the Pasig, elements of the 129th Infantry began their assault on Provisor Island on the 8th of February 1945 to secure the Manila Electrical Company’s (Meralco) steam plant that could supply the city with electricity.[33]

Admiral Iwabuchi, the leader of the inside Manila, moved his headquarters from the city to Fort McKinley with word of withdrawal considerations on the 9th of February 1945.[34] Another man on the move that morning was Senator Elpidio Quirino whose home came under American shellfire, forcing him and his family of seven out.[35] Another family, Syquia joined Quirino’s family until it was divided at the corner of California and Pennsylvania by a Japanese MG nest.[36] In the dense smoke, the booming of American artillery, and the clatter of machine guns, two of Quirino’s children (Tommy, 21, and Vicky, 13) had fled to safety while their mother Alicia was gunned down.[37] Their father broke through a fence to safety, unsure of the fate of his family, and never saw his other children, Armando or Fe Angela, again.[38] 
Elsewhere, Japanese teams had been rounding up civilians in Malate in St. Paul’s College, survivors estimated the total number of refugees in the school to be between 800-1,000 people of all nationalities.[39] The groups were gathered around 5 pm in a large hall and offered food and drink by the Japanese who showed it was safe to consume.[40] Any hope of safety was forgotten as the Japanese detonated hidden explosives which resulted in the collapse of large sections of the roof and attacked the crowd with grenades and bayonets.[41] The Allies placed the death toll of this massacre at around 373.[42] 
February 10th, 1945, brought the end of any sanctuary in refugee-filled areas around the German Club and the nearby Dr. Price House.[43] About 500 died and numerous females were raped in the German Club and more than 100 were massacred in the Dr. Price House, each razed, and attacked in the increasingly common manner of atrocity.[44] Inside the Philippines Red Cross Headquarters, staff and refugees attempted to survive the shootings in the streets and obey the commands of the occasional intruder, however, on the 10th Japanese naval troops turned the hospital into a bloody ruin.*[45] Nurses and doctors resisted, begging and fighting back to little avail.[46] By the end of the day, the Japanese naval troops had slaughtered more than 53 civilians including women, babies, doctors, and wounded patients, before torching the building.[47] Further west at the Bay View Hotel, another nightmare began for 40 women who were raped.[48] Hundreds of other women lived in terror because of the Japanese until they were burnt and massacred in one of the many hotels that turned into brothels.[49] All across Asia, the Japanese had established a system of sexual slavery, the victims of which were enthusiastically termed “comfort women.”[50] Thousands of girls, women, and boys were employed in this system from Myanmar to Guam, transported to far-flung battlefields where it was deemed necessary.[51]

One of the victims of the Bay View Hotel recounted her story in the trial of the overall commander of Japanese force in the Philippines, General Yamashita, Priscilla Garcia was only fifteen years old when she had been taken into an isolated room at gunpoint and forced to strip naked.[52] When her assailant found it difficult to rape her, he drew his knife and cut her open.[53] Before finishing the deed, he led her back to her sister covered in blood, and was raped three more times that night.[54]
By the time most Japanese resistance had been subdued on the 11th of February 1945, a combination of Japanese sabotage and American firepower had reduced all the major concrete in Provisor Island facilities to ruins.[55] The facilities did not provide electricity for some time after the end of the fighting.[56] As the 11th Airborne and 1st Cavalry moved to close the noose around Manila, Admiral Iwabuchi moved his headquarters from Sakura Barracks (Fort McKinley) into the city.[57] Elpidio Quirino was also on the move. Quirino reunited with some of his children before attempting to recover the bodies of his daughters and wife.[58] He was only able to bury the small fragile remains of little Fe Angela.[59] Taking what little they could, the Quirinos, the Mendozas, and the Syquias tried to find shelter in the remains of the city, first along Pedro Gil Street, what was originally known as Herran Street, then to a house on the corner of Tennessee Street.[60]

After sparse contact between patrols, elements of the 1st Cavalry and 11th Airborne finally united on the 12th of February 1945, isolating Iwabuchi’s remaining 6 battalions, practically all of their artillery smashed by American counter-battery fire.[61] Like many others, further tragedy befell the Quirino refugee group. They moved to the Philippine Women’s University.[62] A stray shell exploded inside the building, mutilating four civilians, leaving the cousins Tommy Quirino and Raul Mendoza (13) badly injured, the latter of whom was left behind as the group fled to another bomb shelter that had been identified by the proactive searching of Elpidio.[63] Further south, the regular harassment of the priests and refugees who were hiding from shellfire in the De La Salle College suddenly gave way to massacre.[64] In 20 minutes Japanese naval troops killed and wounded 40** men, women, and children with bayonets.[65] They prowled the campus through streams of blood and gore in search of survivors, a handful of troopers going as far as to attempt to rape the corpse of a 14-year-old girl on the following day.[66] Moving along to Vermont Street, which was under fire from American shells and anxious Japanese soldiers, Quirino settled his survivors in the bomb shelter and made his way to their previous settlement, unable to save those he had left behind in the chaos of the shelling.[67] Even after undertaking such risks, Quirino understood the survival of his injured son and the remainder of his group relied upon him to find a place away from the battle. In turn, he snuck eastwards until he reached American lines in Paco.[68] Once inside the American lines, he was recognized, given food, and the much-treasured American cigarettes returned to his delirious son famished and in agony.[69] He awoke the boy and offered him a cigarette and soon after, he led his family out of their shelter once more and to the eastern estero on the other side of the American lines.[70] Back on Pennsylvania Street, American forces spotted Japanese troops at the Philippine General Hospital and the following report led to the removal of artillery restrictions against the structure.[71] Meanwhile, inside the hospital, Japanese troops spent their nights terrorizing the nurses and female patients by stabbing their bayonets into beds or walls as the women screamed.[72] 

A malnourished child pictured with US Army rations after bombing of Manila. Source: U.S. Archives

By February 13th, 1945, American forces unified across the city: Tondo, Paco, Pasay, Malate, and Santa Ana were liberated.[73] However, the long and bloody siege for the Japanese fortifications centered on the New Police Station had only just begun.[74] Japanese forces showed no sign of abating their bloody fury, killing the Venezuelan consul Alberto Delfino, his wife, son, and several others.[75] General Yokoyama of Shimbu group concluded that the fight was unwinnable and ordered Iwabuchi to return to Fort McKinley and to withdraw immediately.[76] With only the estero between his family and safety, Quirino swam across the tributary five times, ferrying his family on a scavenged door before leading them to Pandacan.[77] Upon arriving they searched for medical assistance as Tomas Quirino’s toes began to turn black.[78] They received transport to San Lazaro where doctors told him that Tomas’ leg needed to be amputated.[79] Quirino demanded the assistance of his cousin, Dr. May Quirino, who managed to save Tomas’ leg.[80]
On the 14th of February in 1945, American artillery and mortars fired more than 3,000 explosive and white phosphorus rounds into Japanese positions near the Taft Avenue-Hospital-University area as they attempted to advance.[81] The anonymous diary of an Ermita district refugee was later published in the Free Philippines newspaper, recalling that day as “the most terrific shelling we had ever experienced,” adding further that upon entering the hospital, he found it full of patients and refugees with little to no food and water to go around.[82] Further south, the Americans found the newly captured Nichols Airfield where many paratroopers died, was too badly damaged to be usable in the future.[83] 

Aware and concerned about the situation developing in Manila, General Yamashita ordered the withdrawal of Japanese forces from the city on the 15th of February.[84] At the same time, Iwabuchi’s immediate superior General Yokoyama ordered Iwabuchi to launch a counter-attack alongside him.[85] Neither order reached Iwabuchi until the 17th of February when the limited counter-attacks had already been called off.[86] Regardless, American forces continued their advance, shelling the fortifications around the Taft Avenue-Hospital-University.[87] The son of one of the doctors, Rodolfo Tupas, recorded the heavy civilian casualties, helping to the best of his ability while young doctors, like Dr. Victor Reyes, operated 20 hours a day.[88] Meanwhile, the survivors of De La Salle struggled on as their numbers dwindled, scrounging for food and water.[89] Many wished for death to spare them from the pain as shelling worsened until after three days of torture, they heard that the Americans had arrived.[90] 

Allied troops spent most of the 16th of February, 1945, meticulously fighting in the north around Taft Avenue-Hospital-University. In the south, American forces secured Rizal Stadium and Fort Abad and established an initial foothold in the Nurses’ Dormitory at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).[91] Confirming the presence of civilians inside the General Hospital, the American 148th Infantry limited their fire to the foundations, where many refugees had fled during the intense shelling.[92] Rodolfo Tupas wrote of his observations of what was happening inside the hospital: “the only Japanese I remember were the few who dressed as doctors and ordered the men (refugees) to put out the fire wherever it started. The rest were outside the PGH along Taft Avenue.”[93]

On February 17th, 1945, after receiving orders to coordinate with the Shimbu group and secure positions in the east, Iwabuchi made it clear that withdrawal was no longer possible nor did he consider attempting to evacuate the city compatible with his main priority: holding the city at the highest cost to Allied forces.[94] After days of bitter fighting, the American 148th Infantry finally managed to storm the remaining holdouts in the Philippines General Hospital, struggling to evacuate the thousands of refugees.[95] Robert Smith, author of the masterful official American History of the Philippines Campaign, claimed 7,000 civilians were evacuated on February 17th.[96] From the 3rd of February to the 17th, the staff and patients underwent a nightmarish odyssey with exceptional courage.[97] The Philippine General Hospital had functioned relentlessly for all 14 days when American shells had fallen like rain and as Japanese forces scoured the streets.[98]
Between the 17th and 18th of February, 1945, an estimated 1,300 Japanese troops of naval forces at Fort McKinley had—unconfirmed whether they had Iwabuchi’s permission—escaped to join Shimbu group in the east.***[99] As such the soldiers of the 11th Airborne and 1st Cavalry took the lightly defended Fort on the 19th.[100]
Fighting on the 20th of February, 1945, was especially brutal as US forces laid siege to the earthquake-proof buildings outside Intramuros like individual structures like the City Hall and New Police Station.[101] At this point, there were hundreds of casualties over singular buildings as Japanese forces fought to the death against American troops, employing as much firepower as they could muster against positions that would hold out for days.[102] 
Even as the allies methodically reduced Japanese positions, a clear degree of communication and control was still present on the 21st of February, 1945, the Shimbu group issued orders to Manila Naval Defense Forces inside the city to head for Infanta far east from Manila.[103] Meanwhile, forces in the doomed city continued to issue new orders, carbon copied and mimeographed to be distributed to the troops.[104]
Through February 22nd, 1945, Allied forces slowly progressed in taking Manila City Hall, Manila Post Office, and Manila Hotel.[105]

Citizens of Manila run for safety from suburbs burned by Japanese soldiers, 10 February 1945. Public Domain

With the approaches to Intramuros secured, US forces unleashed another massive barrage on the 23rd of February, 1945, before pushing into the Walled City from two sides, eventually reaching Fort Santiago by noon.[106] As Allied troops cleared the fortress, there was an absence of male refugees: hundreds of malnourished bodies lay dead in a 15 by 18-foot steel cage.[107] In another nearby dungeon, four rows of 50 dead bodies were stacked on top of one another, their corpses shrunken by hunger.[108] It is estimated that between the 10th and the 23rd of February, 1945, Japanese troops killed at least 4,000 civilians in Fort Santiago alone.[109] At San Agustin, thousands of people lived in terror of the Japanese who occupied the church and attacked them with grenades.[110] The Japanese also plucked out the Spaniards and Mestizos women as American artillery thundered overhead, reaping its toll.[111]

Filipino women and children killed by Japanese. Source: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration

The final mopping-up was carried out from the 24th to the 25th of February, 1945, with American artillerymen turning their attention to the government center that contained the Finance, Legislative, and Agricultural buildings.[112] Though the seizure of Intramuros ended quickly, the fighting for the last three major positions in Manila dispelled any hope that the final victory would not be costly. 

By February 26th, 1945, the Agricultural building had been under siege for three days.[113] Iwabuchi holding out in one of its rooms, reassured his men by stating, “If we run out of bullets we will use grenades; if we run out of grenades, we will cut down the enemy with swords; if we break our swords, we will kill them by sinking our teeth deep in their throats.”[114] Despite his bold words, Iwabuchi later called the survivors of the Manila Naval Defense Forces (MNDF) to his headquarters, apologizing for forcing them into their fate before returning to his quarters and killing himself.[115] He was posthumously promoted to Vice Admiral.[116]
Early in the morning on the 27th of February, 1945, the government buildings were under constant bombardment when Sergio Osmeña and various officials joined MacArthur at Malacanang palace where formal control was handed back to the Filipino government, now headed by Manuel Quezon’s successor, Osmeña.[117] It was a bitter and powerful ceremony for all involved. MacArthur, in the palace from which his father had ruled the Philippines as Governor-General of the American colony, was unable to finish his brief speech, requiring Osmeña to finish where MacArthur had faltered.[118] Osmeña expressed deep grief for the cost paid to restore in the general’s words, “the citadel of democracy in the East.”[119]

Refugees flee from Intramuros to safety, February 23, 1945. Source: US National Archives

Allied forces called on the Japanese in the public buildings to surrender on the 25th, 26th, and 27th of February, and March 1st, extolling their fierce defense and promising a place in a new Japan, for all their efforts only 29 Japanese and Formosans surrendered in the various buildings.[120] However,  the fanatics in the Finance building used a feigned surrender to ambush Allied troops.[121] Unobstructed by refugees or restrained by the presence of civilians, Allied forces put the skills they had learned in the crucible of the urban fight to full effect. The first to fall was the Legislative building, its tunnels and fighting position cleared by the 148th Infantry on the 28th of February.[122] The Agriculture building followed suit on the 1st of March, 1945, and lastly the Finance on the 3rd of March, 1945. On that final day, Commander of XIV Corps Lieutenant General Oscar W. Griswold reported to his superiors that all organized resistance in Manila had ended.[123]

A Filipino civilian attempting to identify the bodies that lined this and many other streets. Source: US National Archives

Atrocities across Manila
While countless in number, the various crimes committed by Japanese and Makapili (Filipino collaborationist paramilitaries) forces often shared significant commonality as an inspection team of XIV Corps observed:
“[General nature of Japanese atrocities were] (1) The bayoneting and shooting of unarmed civilians - men, women and children- with rifles, pistols, machine guns, and the throwing of grenades at them.
(2) The herding of large numbers of civilians - men, women, and children - in to inflammable buildings, the barring of doors and windows, and setting fire to the buildings.
(3) The throwing of grenades into dugouts where unarmed civilians were taking cover, burying alive those who were not, killed by the grenades.
(4) The assembling of men in large groups and the tying of their hands and then bayoneting, beheading, or shooting them.
(5) Theft from civilians of money, valuables, food, and the looting and burning of their homes.
(6) Tying the hands and blindfolding of Chinese and Filipino men and then beheading them with a sabre on a chopping block.
(7) Torturing both military prisoners of war and civilians by beating, kicking in the face, burning, and making them assume contorted positions for long periods of time until they lost consciousness in the attempt to make them reveal information which the Japanese desired.
(8) General disregard of the rights of prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention.
(9) The taking of large groups of girls, as many as a hundred, to a hotel and the systematic raping of all of them, the attention of an average of three or four men being forced on each girl.
(10) The massacre of refugees, doctors, and nurses at the Philippine Red Cross Headquarters, and general disrespect for the rights of the Red Cross under the Geneva Convention.”[124]
While violence was sometimes spontaneous, the scale and the nature of these crimes combined with the documents and survivors’ testimonies made clear this was part of a systemic plan to demolish the city and exterminate the population deemed to be hostile.[125] This behavior or motivation was not unique except for its brutality. Filipino collaborators connected with General Artemio Ricarte, Narciso Lapus, and Joaquin S. Galang, testifying in Yamashita’s trial reported that in October 1944, Yamashita had said he ordered that when the population gave signs of pro-American movement or actions.[126] The whole population of that disloyal place should be wiped out. In December of 1944, Yamshita had congratulated and ordered the Kempeitai (the Japanese military/secret police) in Manila for this fine work in “suppressing guerrilla activities” as hundreds were executed with the most cursory of trials.[127] During the battle, the command continued to organize the execution of Filipino civilians. An order from the 15th of February, 1945 stated, “[...] 5. When Filipinos are to be killed, they must be gathered into one place and disposed of with the consideration that ammunition and manpower must not be used to excess. Because the disposal of dead bodies is a troublesome task, they should be gathered into houses which are scheduled to be burned or demolished. They should also be thrown into the river.”[128] More than willing to subject the Filipinos to the sword, it is predictable that the Japanese had little interest in protecting those civilians. In doing so they also bear the responsibility for the other great tragedy to befall Manila in 1945. 

American firepower might well have been of comparable lethality to the intentional annihilation of civilians by the Japanese. The shelling by American forces was routinely a more pressing concern for the civilians they were tasked to liberate than the Japanese soldiers on the street.[129] It had been a calculated decision by U.S. forces to attain a military advantage, aware of the human costs, prompted by the prospect of terrifying attrition.[130]  However, it must be remembered that these dilemmas only arose because of Japanese command that chose to defend the city, making no effort to evacuate or protect the civilians. Time and time again the Japanese were offered a chance to surrender or spare the Filipinos surrounding the ensuing battle, yet only small groups of soldiers surrendered.[131] This does not absolve MacArthur of all wrongdoing, his “crusade” was plagued with errors. The failure to appreciate the possibility of a Navy defense of the city or the commitment of 1st Cavalry without adequate civil affairs and sustainment support, or the absence of a plan for a contested city leading to many of the vital policies such as the securing of infrastructure conceived hastily by his subordinates.[132] Fortunately for the unprepared American occupying forces, the immediate situation in Manila after the battle could have been far worse. The city was spared of any major outbreaks of influenza, cholera, dysentery, and typhoid which medical authorities had dreaded, equally fortunate was the capture of the main reservoir three months later by the 6th Army which narrowly avoided a water famine.[133] Nevertheless, civilians continued to perish due to tuberculosis, gangrene, tetanus, and dysentery.[134]

General Yamashita photographed upon receiving his verdict on December 7th, 1945. Source: Harry S. Truman Library & Museum, photo by Lewis D. Klein

Guilt and Command Responsibility 
The end of the Second World War brought a desire for justice and accountability, which form much of the groundwork for modern international law. Before the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials was the trial of Gen. Yamashita. Although the man that was most responsible for the holocaust that occurred in Manila was already dead Admiral Iwabuchi, had committed suicide in the Agriculture Building on the 26th, and his Army equivalent Colonel Noguchi died on the 25th of February, 1945, the Allies needed a head to hold accountable.[135] Yamashita’s trial occurred from October 29, 1945, to December 7, 1945, at the Philippine High Commissioner’s Residence.[136] Of the 123 crimes alleged, Yamashita denied ordering the offenses, having any knowledge of them as a result of the conditions in theatre, and that if he had known or foreseen such offenses, he would have committed to stopping them.[137] While the prosecution had initially contended that establishing knowledge was not necessary and anticipating a poor reception from the Commission, they introduced evidence that directly linked Yamashita to the atrocities.[138] The defense argued that: (1) there was not sufficient evidence that the accused knew of the alleged crimes, (2) that he lacked the means and authority to prevent the crimes, (3) that such a standard as was applied had little basis and could not have been used against an American general, and (4) the commission lacked jurisdiction over the defendant (which became central to the Supreme Court appeal).[139] The case was intensely controversial and reached the US Supreme Court. The results have been subject to skepticism and revisionism in many circles.[140] The defense had been rushed, in a trial overseen by a tribunal that had no significant legal experience, and that had accepted hearsay evidence.[141] No one could doubt the intense sense of revenge that existed from the average Manileño/a on the street up to the American General Douglas MacArthur, however, this is not uncommon for trials of war criminals. Nevertheless, there was certainly a legal basis for the punishment of U.S. commanders and an international concept of Command Responsibility existing within the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 of which both Japan and the U.S. were of signatories.[142] The inclusion of hearsay equates to prejudicing a judge as it would a jury, a notion that has a basis in U.S civil law, which exercised an extensive influence on the international law of the period.[143] Moreover, in the face of difficult tactical conditions, Yamashita’s headquarters possessed and utilized communication and was able to contact Manila until June 1945.[144] He also retained the ability to contact those who have been in command of the MNDF if he had not been many of which lived locally to him.[145] Yamashita never inspected the conditions of the prisoner-of-war camps even those local to him.[146] Witnesses could testify to his knowledge and admiration for rigged trials that led to the mass execution of Filipino civilians whom he harbored significant distrust and whom he made no effort to spare, reportedly seeing the group as a whole as enemies of the empire.[147] For all the debate around the chain of command between the branches, Yamashita exercised command over his forces while they conducted sustained and calculated massacres in Manila. Any negotiation of his responsibility for what unfolded in Manila could not protect him from the crimes committed before the Americans had even arrived. The commission found “Tomoyuki YAMASHITA, General Imperial Japanese Army, between 9 October 1944 and 2 September 1945, at Manila and other places in the Philippine Islands, while commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the United States of America and its allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against people of the United States and its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines; and he, General Tomoyuki YAMASHITA, thereby violated the law of war.”[148] The Yamashita Standard or Command Responsibility remains a key part of international criminal law today, ensuring that while authority can be delegated, responsibility cannot; just as a commander is responsible for feeding and leading their soldiers, they are equally responsible for ensuring their conduct per the laws of war, exercise the control over their subordinates to ensure compliance, and that the knowledge required to exercise these responsibilities is one of the responsibilities of command.[149]
Manila Reconstructed
In the short term, Manila faced several significant challenges. The countless civilians made homeless by the battle struggled to get by in a city with no electricity and only receiving water from small artisan wells or mostly contaminated water pits.[150] Garbage disposal had stopped months before the Americans arrived and sewage disposal had collapsed later both underground in sewers and on the surface, dead civilians lay on the streets and in the ruins of homes.[151] Disease became a chief concern for public authorities. As ever, prostitution proliferated in the newly occupied city, leading to sharp increases in venereal disease rates.[152] Transport, communication, and any medical resource from hospital beds to basic medicine was either non-existent or desperately limited.[153] Progress to restoring basic health safety and amenities came at a steady pace. In the first ten weeks of US military control over the Manila Department of Health and Welfare, disease tracking was restored.[154] 2,000 health inspections were administered for the newly sprung-up bars and restaurants and 12,000 city blocks were cleaned and recleaned.[155] 
Between the Japanese and Americans, 613 Filipino city blocks where 11,000 buildings once sat had been destroyed.[156] A post-war American government financial agency assessed damage not covered under insurance to public, private, and religious property at $800 million (well over $10 billion by 2018).[157] The National Museum of the Philippines, the National Museum, the Scientific Library, the Manila Observatory, and the Philippine General Hospital lost hundreds of thousands of paintings, sculptures, medical records, books, and almost four centuries of typhoon and earthquake records respectively.[158] The U.S. offered $1.24 billion for war damages of the $8 billion in damages estimated by the Philippine government and the final payment was only authorized once the Filipino government had approved the U.S-Philippine Trade Agreement of 1946 which established free trade between the two countries as well as giving U.S. citizens and corporations special privileges normally reserved for Filipino citizens; a post-colonial privilege.[159] These funds were used to rebuild much of the pre-war splendor of Manila, the Manila City Hall, the Post Office building, the Agriculture, Finance, and Legislative buildings, and the University of the Philippines while the third generation of Filipino architects built new structures in the modernist style springing from post-war austerity.[160] As the city moved on, so did its people; Rodolfo Tupas spent his years as a journalist for the Sunday Times and Expresssweek papers, finding himself intertwined with the world of Philippine Muslim affairs and serving as the first Filipino ambassador to Libya, dying peacefully in 1983.[161] Elpidio Quirino eventually became the President of the independent commonwealth following the death of Manuel Roxas in April 1948.[162] Despite all that he had lost, his wife, and his daughters, Quirino came to reconcile with the Japanese as best he could, repatriating the Japanese war criminals back to the home islands.[163]

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Sources:
1. General Staff of MacArthur, “Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume 1,” Https://Www.history.army.mil/Books/Wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/Index.htm#Contents, 1994, 13-16, 37-38.
2. Robert Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 50th Anniversary Commemorative Edition (Center of Military History, 1993), https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/CMH_Pub_5-10-1.pdf, 307.
 More information on this can be found in a brief paper by the American Historian Richard Meixsel titled, “Did 100,000 Civilians Die in the Battle of Manila in 1945: Robert Ross Smith’s Triumph in the Philippines and the Story of a Number.”  https://corregidor.org/refdoc/Reference_Reading/Meixsel/DID-100,000-CIVILIANS-DIE-IN-THE-BATTLE-OF-MANILA-IN-1945-/index.html.
3. Kevin T. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila, February 1945” (1993), 32.
4. John C. McManus, To the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945 (Penguin, 2023), 48-49.
5. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 48-49.
6. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 49. Albert E. Holland, The Santo Tomas Internment Camp Diary of Albert E. Holland 1944-1945. 1945, Trinity College Digital Repository, 2011, https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/trinarchives/3/, 37.
7. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 49.
8. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 251-252; McManus, To the End of the Earth, 51.
9. James M Scott, Rampage: MacArthur, Yamashita, and the Battle of Manila (W. W. Norton & Company, 2018), 162; Alphonso J. Aluit, By Sword and Fire: The Destruction of Manila in World War II, 3 February - 3 March 1945 (Bookmark Press, 1995), 152-153; McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 23.
10. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 1945, https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4680/, 83, 85.
11. Scott, Rampage, 162-163.
12. Courtney Whitney, “The Case of General Yamashita: A Memorandum,” 1949, 7; Scott, Rampage, 182-185.
13. Scott, Rampage, 182-185.
14. Scott, Rampage, 182-185.
15. Scott, Rampage, 183-185.
16. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 38.
17. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 166.
18. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 166.
19. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 166, 415.
20. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 177.
21. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 177.
22. Scott, Rampage, 201
23. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 85-87; Scott, Rampage, 180-181.
24. Scott, Rampage, 174-177.
25. Scott, Rampage, 174-177.
26. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 182
27. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 181.
28. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 181.
* Small waterways, similar to canals.
29. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 180, 183.
30. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 183-187.
31. Jack Percival, “Japanese Atrocities Make Tale of Horror,” Sydney Morning Herald, April 13, 1945, https://corregidor.org/mnl/Percival/Jack_Percival.htm; José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 4.
32. Anselmo Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1986), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA165904.pdf, 35; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 264.
33. Caleb Ling, “The Smart City: Achieving Positions of Relative Advantage during Urban Large-Scale Combat Operations” (2019), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1085100.pdf, 63-64.
34. Ricardo Trota José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre): Japanese Accounts of the Battle of Manila,” corregidor.org, 2019, https://corregidor.org/mnl/Jose/rtj_01.htm, 3.
35. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 217.
36. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 217-218.
37. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 218, 227, 241.
38. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 218, 227, 241.
39. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 221.
40. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 221-224.
41. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 221-224.
42. Whitney, “The Case of General Yamashita,” 9.
43. Whitney, “The Case of General Yamashita,” 14.
44. Whitney, “The Case of General Yamashita,” 14.
45. Scott, Rampage, 304-309; Emil Krause and R. Graham Bosworth, “Inspector General’s Report on the Manila Atrocities - 6 April 1945,” 1945, https://corregidor.org/refdoc/Reference_Reading/IG_Report/Inspector-Generals-Report-on-The-Manila-Atrocities---6-April-1945/2/index.html, 31-32.* Though the Headquarters had been mostly spared from shelling, the Japanese had gone out of their way to endanger the civilians inside, according to a survivor, Mr. Farolan, they had prevented the raising of the protected Red Cross flags and attempting to plant devices that imitated the sound of artillery in the backyard.
46. Scott, Rampage, 304-309; Krause and Bosworth, “Inspector General’s Report,” 31-32.
47. Scott, Rampage, 304-309; Whitney, “The Case of General Yamashita,” 8.
48. Nakano Satoshi, "The Death of Manila in World War II and its Postwar Commemoration" (preprint manuscript, 2019), PDF, 10.
49. Satoshi, "The Death of Manila in World War II,” 10.
50. Alexis Dudden, “A Guide to Understanding the History of the ‘Comfort Women’ Issue,” United States Institute of Peace, September 16, 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/09/guide-understanding-history-comfort-women-issue.
51. Dudden, “History of the ‘Comfort Women’ Issue.”
52. Scott, Rampage, 262-263, 471.
53. Scott, Rampage, 263.
54. Scott, Rampage, 264.
55. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 263.
56. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 260-263.
57. José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 3; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 289.
58. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 241.
59. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 241.
60. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 241.
61. Scott, Rampage, 343;  XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 93-94.
62. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 276.
63. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 276-277.
64. Scott, Rampage, 328-332.
65. Scott, Rampage, 336.
66. Scott, Rampage, 328-336, 338. 
** This number is usually put around 40-41 for the massacre on the 12th, the number 76 in or around the site is also common.
67. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 277.
68. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 278.
69. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 278.
70. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 277-278.
71. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 275.
72. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 275.
73. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 416-417.
74. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 280.
75. Whitney, “The Case of General Yamashita,” 9.
76. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 291.
​77. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 299-300.
78. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 299-300.
79. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 299-301.
80. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 299-301.
81. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 285-287.
82. Anonymous, “Diary of Anonymous Refugee from Ermita,” Free Philippines, February 22, 1945, https://archive.org/details/ManilaFreePhilippinesPart1/page/n1/mode/2up?q=hospital&view=theater.
83. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 94.
84. Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B, III-19.
85. Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B, III-19.
86. XIV Corps, “Japanese Defense of Cities as Exemplified by the Battle for Manila,” 1945, https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/U_Battle_For_Manila.pdf, 15; Avenido et al., CSI Battlebook 13-B, III-19.
87. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 312.
88. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 312.
89. Scott, Rampage, 339-340.
90. Scott, Rampage, 339-340; Satoshi, "The Death of Manila in World War II,” 9.
91. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 101-104; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 287.
92. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 287; Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 316.
93. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 316.
94. José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 3; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 273.
95. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 287.
96. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 287.
97. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 321.
98. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 265, 321.
99. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 274.*** an example of the flawed logic behind the narrative of the Japanese being ‘bottled up’ by XIV Corps forced to fight to the death.
100. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 98-99.
101. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 283-285.
102. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 283-285.
103. José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 3.
104. José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 1.
105. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 277-290.
106. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 297-298.
107. United States Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Sack of Manila (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1945), https://ia804509.us.archive.org/2/items/sack-of-manila/Sack%20of%20Manila.pdf, 18-19
108. United States Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Sack of Manila, 18.
109. Whitney, “The Case of General Yamashita,” 10.
110. Philippine Commonwealth. Office of the Resident Commissioner to the United States, “Report on the Destruction of Manila and Japanese Atrocities,” 1945, https://corregidor.org/refdoc/Reference_Reading/GHQ/The-Destruction-of-Manila-and-Japanese-Atrocities/2/index.html, 33-40.
111. Philippine Commonwealth, “Report on the Destruction of Manila and Japanese Atrocities,” 33-40.
112. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 125-130.
113. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 125-130.
114. José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 4.
115. José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 1.
116. José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 1, 4.
117. Scott, Rampage, 409.
118. Scott, Rampage, 410-411.
119. Scott, Rampage, 410-411.
120. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 249-250.
121. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 249-250; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 306.
122. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 134.
123. XIV Corps, “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 134.
124. Krause and Bosworth, “Inspector General’s Report,” 42-43.
125. Krause and Bosworth, “Inspector General’s Report,” 43.
126. Whitney, “The Case of General Yamashita,” 17.
127. Whitney, “The Case of General Yamashita,” 17-19.
128. José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 4.
129. This is important, not bombing as is often erroneously stated, airpower was prohibited inside the city—except for Cub spotter planes—despite significant complaints from tactical commanders and the limited airstrikes conducted against areas like Nicholas field could not have contributed significantly to the extensive destruction of the city.
130. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 264.
131. With some exceptions, one of the largest being southwest of Quezon Gate in Intramuros around 1,300 on the 23rd allowed nearly 3,000 civilians to escape before the ensuing bombardment. This incident is recorded in more detail in page 299 of Triumph in the Philippines.
132. McEnery, “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila,” 50-52.
133. Maurice Pincoffs, “Health Problems in Manila,” Transactions of the American Clinical and Climatological Association 58 (1946): 18-19, 23, 27-28, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2242330/.
134. Pincoffs, “Health Problems in Manila,” 18-20, 27-29.
135. José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 1.
136. Scott, Rampage, 445.
137. William H Parks, “Command Responsibility for War Crimes,” Military Law Review 62 (1973): 24-25, https://battleofmanila.org/Parks/COMMAND-RESPONSIBILITY-FOR-WAR-CRIMES---Maj.-William-H.-Parks/index.html.
138. Parks, “Command Responsibility,” 85-86; United Nations War Crimes Commission, “Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals,” vol. IV, 1948, https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llmlp/Law-Reports_Vol-4/Law-Reports_Vol-4.pdf, 1-2.
139. United Nations War Crimes Commission, “Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals,” 1-2, 12.
140. For example: Ann Marie Prevost, “Race and War Crimes: The 1945 War Crimes Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita,” Human Rights Quarterly 14, no. 3 (August 1992): 320, https://doi.org/10.2307/762369. 
Much of the basis for his innocence in the present day relies upon the uncritical acceptance of deeply invested individuals such as Frank Reel, one of Yamashita’s former defense lawyers. 
141. Prevost, “Race and War Crimes,” 316-318.
142. International Committee of the Red Cross, “Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.,” International Humanitarian Law Databases, n.d., https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/hague-conv-iv-1907/state-parties?activeTab=undefined.
143. United Nations War Crimes Commission, “Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals,” 43; Michaela Halpern, “Trends in Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence in War Crime Trials: Is Fairness Really Preserved?,” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 29, no. 103 (2018): 105–119, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djcil/vol29/iss1/3/.
144. Parks, “Command Responsibility,” 25.
145. Scott, Rampage, 93-94; José, “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre),” 3.
146. Parks, “Command Responsibility,” 26.
147. Whitney, “The Case of General Yamashita,” 17-19.
148. Parks, “Command Responsibility,” 23.
149. Parks, “Command Responsibility,” 98-101.
150. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 88; Pincoffs, “Health Problems in Manila,” 19.
151. Pincoffs, “Health Problems in Manila,” 19-20.
152. Scott, Rampage, 430-431; Pincoffs, “Health Problems in Manila,” 27.
153. Pincoffs, “Health Problems in Manila,” 20.
154. Pincoffs, “Health Problems in Manila,” 21-23; Blanche B. Armfield, The Medical Department of the United States Army in World War II. (Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1963), https://achh.army.mil/history/book-wwii-orgadmin-org-admin-wwii-chpt11, 482-483.
155. Pincoffs, “Health Problems in Manila,” 20-26.
156. Scott, Rampage, 426-427.
157. Scott, Rampage, 426-427.
158. McManus, To the End of the Earth, 88.
159. Laura Jeanne Henze, “U.S.-Philippine Economic Relations and Trade Negotiations,” Asian Survey 16, no. 4 (1976): 321-323, 327, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2643209; Filipinas Heritage Library, “Manila Reborn: An Exhibit on the Postwar Reconstruction of a City,” Google Arts & Culture, 2015, https://artsandculture.google.com/story/manila-reborn-filipinas-heritage-library/gQVxQknmPODGJA?hl=en.
160. Gerard Lico, “Rising from of the Ashes: Post-War Philippines Architecture,” Docomomo Journal 57 (2017): 47-48, https://www.docomomo.pt/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/DocomomoJournal57_2017_GLico.pdf; Filipinas Heritage Library, “Manila Reborn.”
161. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 412.
162. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 410.
163. Aluit, By Sword and Fire, 410.

Works Cited
Aluit, Alphonso J. By Sword and Fire: The Destruction of Manila in World War II, 3 February - 3 March 1945. Bookmark Press, 1995.
Anonymous. “Diary of Anonymous Refugee from Ermita.” Free Philippines, February 22, 1945. https://archive.org/details/ManilaFreePhilippinesPart1/page/n1/mode/2up?q=hospital&view=theater.
Armfield, Blanche B. The Medical Department of the United States Army in World War II. Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1963. https://achh.army.mil/history/book-wwii-orgadmin-org-admin-wwii-chpt11. 
Avenido, Anselmo, John Benedict, Buddy Buck, Norm Benninghoff, Dick Demers, Jim Groce, Jim Harpole, et al. CSI Battlebook 13-B: The Battle of Manila. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1986. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA165904.pdf.
Dudden, Alexis. “A Guide to Understanding the History of the ‘Comfort Women’ Issue.” United States Institute of Peace, September 16, 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/09/guide-understanding-history-comfort-women-issue. 
Filipinas Heritage Library. “Manila Reborn: An Exhibit on the Postwar Reconstruction of a City.” Google Arts & Culture, 2015. https://artsandculture.google.com/story/manila-reborn-filipinas-heritage-library/gQVxQknmPODGJA?hl=en.
General Staff of MacArthur. “Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume 1.” Https://Www.history.army.mil/Books/Wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/Index.htm#Contents, 1994.
Goodman, Grant K. “The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines: Commonwealth Sustained.” Philippine Studies 36, no. 1 (1988): 98–104. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42633066.
Halpern, Michaela. “Trends in Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence in War Crime Trials: Is Fairness Really Preserved?” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 29, no. 103 (2018): 103–26. https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djcil/vol29/iss1/3/.
Henze, Laura Jeanne. “U.S.-Philippine Economic Relations and Trade Negotiations.” Asian Survey 16, no. 4 (1976): 319–37. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2643209.
International Committee of the Red Cross. “Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.” International Humanitarian Law Databases, n.d. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/hague-conv-iv-1907/state-parties?activeTab=undefined.
Holland, Albert E. The Santo Tomas Internment Camp Diary of Albert E. Holland 1944-1945. Unpublished Manuscript, 2011, https://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/trinarchives/3/  Trinity College Digital Repository. 
José, Ricardo Trota. “Gyokusai (Honorable Defeat) or Gyakusatsu (Massacre): Japanese Accounts of the Battle of Manila.” corregidor.org, 2019. https://corregidor.org/mnl/Jose/rtj_01.htm.
———. “War and Violence, History and Memory: The Philippine Experience of the Second World War.” Asian Journal of Social Science 29, no. 3 (2001): 457–70. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23653960.
Krause, Emil, and R. Graham Bosworth. “Inspector General’s Report on the Manila Atrocities - 6 April 1945,” 1945. https://corregidor.org/refdoc/Reference_Reading/IG_Report/Inspector-Generals-Report-on-The-Manila-Atrocities---6-April-1945/2/index.html.
Legarda Jr., Benito. “Yamashita’s Guilt, Korean Atrocity and Other Misconceptions about the Liberation of Manila.” battleofmanila.org, 2013. https://battleofmanila.org/Legarda/Benito_Legarda_Jr.htm.
Lico, Gerard. “Rising from of the Ashes: Post-War Philippines Architecture.” Docomomo Journal 57 (2017): 47–55. https://www.docomomo.pt/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/DocomomoJournal57_2017_GLico.pdf.
Ling, Caleb. “The Smart City: Achieving Positions of Relative Advantage during Urban Large-Scale Combat Operations,” 2019. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1085100.pdf.
McEnery, Kevin T. “The XIV Corps Battle for Manila, February 1945,” 1993.
McManus, John C. To the End of the Earth: The US Army and the Downfall of Japan, 1945. Penguin, 2023.
Meixsel, R. B. “Did 100,000 Civilians Die in the Battle of Manila in 1945: Robert Ross Smith’s Triumph in the Philippines and the Story of a Number.” Corregidor, 2023. https://corregidor.org/refdoc/Reference_Reading/Meixsel/DID-100,000-CIVILIANS-DIE-IN-THE-BATTLE-OF-MANILA-IN-1945-/index.html.
Ortigas Foundation Media. “‘Was the Destruction Necessary?’ - a Lecture by James Zobel.” YouTube, 2015. https://youtu.be/y0cGQelGrqY?si=P-HZHiB4fYf0V8f3.
Parks, William H. “Command Responsibility for War Crimes.” Military Law Review 62 (1973). https://battleofmanila.org/Parks/COMMAND-RESPONSIBILITY-FOR-WAR-CRIMES---Maj.-William-H.-Parks/index.html.
Percival, Jack. “Japanese Atrocities Make Tale of Horror.” Sydney Morning Herald, April 13, 1945. https://corregidor.org/mnl/Percival/Jack_Percival.htm.
Philippine Commonwealth. Office of the Resident Commissioner to the United States. “Report on the Destruction of Manila and Japanese Atrocities,” 1945. https://corregidor.org/refdoc/Reference_Reading/GHQ/The-Destruction-of-Manila-and-Japanese-Atrocities/2/index.html.
Pincoffs, Maurice. “Health Problems in Manila.” Transactions of the American Clinical and Climatological Association 58 (1946): 18–30. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2242330/.
Prevost, Ann Marie. “Race and War Crimes: The 1945 War Crimes Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita.” Human Rights Quarterly 14, no. 3 (August 1992): 303–36. https://doi.org/10.2307/762369.
Satoshi, Nakano. “The Death of Manila in World War II and its Postwar Commemoration." Preprint manuscript, 2019, PDF.
Scott, James M. Rampage: MacArthur, Yamashita, and the Battle of Manila. W. W. Norton & Company, 2018.
Smith, Robert. Triumph in the Philippines. 50th Anniversary Commemorative Edition. Center of Military History, 1993. https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-10-1/CMH_Pub_5-10-1.pdf.
United Nations War Crimes Commission. “Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals.” Vol. IV, 1948. https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llmlp/Law-Reports_Vol-4/Law-Reports_Vol-4.pdf. 
United States Senate Committee on Military Affairs. Sack of Manila. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1945. https://ia804509.us.archive.org/2/items/sack-of-manila/Sack%20of%20Manila.pdf.
Whitney, Courtney. “The Case of General Yamashita: A Memorandum,” 1949.
XIV Corps. “After Action Report XIV Corps M-1,” 1945. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/4680/.

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