Battle of Wuhan- The Battle of Tianjiazhen (Part 4)

by Quin Cho 

In August, the 6th Infantry Division resumed its advance north of the Yangtze River, coordinating with elements of the 11th Army advancing south of the river. Their objective was to capture Guangji, followed by the strategically significant fortress of Tianjiazhen (Peattie et al., 213). The 6th Infantry Division encountered stiff resistance from the Chinese 4th Army Corps, which had established in-depth defenses in the hilly terrain south of the Dabie Mountains (Hsu and Chang, 244). Starting in late August, the Chinese 21st and 27th Army Groups launched flank attacks on the 6th Infantry Division near Taihu and Jianshan from the Dabie Mountains (Hsu and Chang, 244). These forces captured Taihu and Jianshan, pressing on to Huangmei.

Despite the pressure, the 6th Infantry Division managed to continue its advance, capturing Guangji on September 6th. However, this success stretched their defensive line to thirty kilometers between Huangmei and Guangji (Japanese Monograph 179, 71). Although Chinese forces nearly encircled the division, they failed to annihilate it (Japanese Monograph 179, 71). Consequently, much of the 6th Infantry Division was tied up defending its communication lines, leaving only the Imamura Detachment—consisting of three battalions—to proceed towards Tianjiazhen, the critical fortress on the Yangtze River (Wu, 201).
Tianjiazhen's significance stemmed from its location at a chokepoint on the Yangtze River, where the river narrows to just 600 meters (Wu, 199). The surrounding mountains, steep cliffs, and eastern slopes made overland approaches difficult, while Chinese batteries and mines in the river rendered an amphibious approach costly (Wu, 199). The fortress was further reinforced by three divisions of central government forces, making it a formidable obstacle.
Despite these challenges, the Imamura Detachment departed from Guangji on September 15th, heading towards Tianjiazhen. Initially, only the Imamura Detachment's three battalions were dispatched, as the rest of the division was needed to protect its extended supply lines. However, the Japanese advance was aided by the Chinese decision to breach dykes and dams along the Yangtze River, which flooded large areas and simplified Japanese logistics (Wu, 201). This flooding reduced the need to defend a long supply line, allowing the Japanese to transport supplies via the expanded Yangtze River from Jiujiang to Huangmei, a distance of just 40 kilometers compared to the previous 200-kilometer route (Wu, 201). This logistical advantage allowed the Imamura Detachment to reach Tianjiazhen on September 16th (Hsu and Chang, 244).
Although the final assault on the fortress was delayed by poor weather, three Chinese corps (the 26th, 48th, and 86th) outflanked and nearly surrounded the 6th Infantry Division. However, the flooded terrain on the division's eastern flank prevented complete encirclement (Wu, 202). The 11th Army's timely dispatch of boats carrying supplies up the Yangtze River allowed the 6th Infantry Division to hold its position near Tianjiazhen (Wu, 202). A series of surprise night attacks, including the use of poison gas, ultimately led to the fall of Tianjiazhen (Frank, 80). The capture of this fortress removed the last major barrier to a Japanese advance towards Wuhan along the Yangtze River.


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Works Cited
Frank, Richard B. Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War, July 1937-May 1942. W.W. Norton & Company, 2021. 
Hsu, Long-hsuen, and Ming-kai Chang. History of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). Chung Wu Publishing, 1972. 
Macri, Franco David. Clash of Empires in South China: The Allied Nations’ Proxy War with Japan, 1935-1941. University Press of Kansas, 2015. 
Ness, Leland. Kangzhan. Helion and Company, 2016. 
Peattie, Mark. The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945. Stanford University Press, 2022. 
United States, Congress, Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East. Central China Area Operations Record, July 1937-May 1941, Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army. 
United States, Congress, Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East. South China Area Operations Record, July 1937-May 1941, Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army. 
Wu, Di. “The Cult of Geography: Chinese Riverine Defence During the Battle of Wuhan, 1937-1938.” War in History, vol. 29, no. 1, 26 Nov. 2020, pp. 185–204, https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344520961548. 

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