Battle of Wuhan- Operational Plans for the Wuhan Campaign (Part 2)

by Quin Cho

The Flooding of the Yellow River and the Strategic Importance of Wuhan

The flooding of the Yellow River, combined with the strategic importance of Wuhan, led the Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) to target Wuhan instead of Zhengzhou for its next major offensive. To capture Wuhan, IGHQ deployed two armies, the 2nd and 11th, each initially comprising three divisions. The 2nd Army commanded the 10th, 13th, and 16th Infantry Divisions, while the 11th Army commanded the 6th, 101st, and 106th Infantry Divisions (Japanese Monograph 179, 44-45, Chart No. 1). The Central China Expeditionary Army, to which the 2nd and 11th Armies belonged, initially had the 3rd, 9th, 18th, and 116th Infantry Divisions in reserve. The 3rd Infantry Division was transferred to the 2nd Army on August 1st, and the 9th Infantry Division was placed under the command of the 11th Army on the same date (Japanese Monograph 179 44-45, Chart No. 1).
The IGHQ planned for the 2nd Army to attack through the Dabie Mountains north of the Yangtze River, while the 11th Army would advance along both sides of the Yangtze (Japanese Monograph 179, 34-35). The primary goal was to converge on Wuhan and seize it, with the annihilation of Chinese forces as a secondary objective (Japanese Monograph 179, 35).

Chinese Defensive Strategy

​The Chinese, led by Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang (KMT) leadership, were aware of the Japanese intent to attack along both sides of the Yangtze River. To counter this, they aimed to force the Japanese into a protracted campaign of attrition (Hsu and Chang, 235-236). The Chinese strategy involved leveraging the terrain, which included mountains north (the Dabie Mountain range) and south of the Yangtze River (Wu, 189). These mountains provided flank protection and hindered the concentration of Japanese combat power (Wu, 189).
The Yangtze River itself was a critical feature, especially given the near non-existence of the Chinese navy. The KMT constructed fixed fortifications along the river to prevent the Japanese from exploiting it (Wu, 190). Two of the most important fortifications were established at Madang and Tianjiazhen, where the Yangtze narrowed, canalizing any potential Japanese approach (Wu, 191). Additionally, the Chinese sank 79 ships in the Yangtze and placed thousands of mines to obstruct Japanese vessels (Wu, 191). These measures were designed to deny Japanese vessels access to the Yangtze, both as an avenue of advance and as a supply line.

The Battle of Wuhan Begins

​The Wuhan Campaign began in earnest with the 3rd and 13th Infantry Divisions advancing north of the Yangtze River. Central China Expeditionary Army commander Hata Shunroku designated the towns of Shouxian, Zhengyangguan, and the Huainan coal mine as their objectives (Japanese Monograph 179, 37). Concurrently, the 6th Infantry Division, part of the 11th Army but north of the Yangtze, advanced towards Huaining from Hefei, supported by the Hata Detachment, which attacked amphibiously from the Yangtze River (Japanese Monograph 179, 38).
The 3rd Infantry Division seized the Huainan coal mine on June 3rd and Shouxian on June 5th, while the 13th Infantry Division captured Zhengyangguan on June 5th (Japanese Monograph 179, 37). The 6th Infantry Division also advanced, taking Shucheng on June 8th and Tongcheng on June 13th (Japanese Monograph 179, 38).
By June 15th, the Hata Detachment landed 2,000 men behind Anqing, outflanking the city and forcing the two Chinese divisions defending it to withdraw (Hsu and Chang, 241).
While the Japanese advanced through the province of Anhui (where Anqing and many of the other cities and towns mentioned earlier are located), they perpetrated a series of heinous atrocities. Japanese atrocities can partially be understood as a means of undermining China’s will and ability to make war (Mackinnon, 39). But the sheer brutality of some of the atrocities seems to suggest that the IJA’s culture promoted gruesome acts of murder, torture, rape, and other crimes (Whitehurst, 308–309). Indeed, the Imperial Japanese Army eventually enshrined this brutality into its doctrine with the so-called “three alls” policy: “kill all, burn all, loot all.” Many of these atrocities would be repeated throughout the summer of 1938 during the Wuhan Campaign.
There are many examples of the Japanese Army’s “three alls” policy in Anhui. After taking Anqing, the Hata Detachment murdered 200 people (History Cannot Be Forgotten: A Complete Record of the Atrocities the Japanese Invaders Committed in Anhui, Part 2). A further 36 civilians on a boat were killed by Japanese marines supposedly because they were Chinese soldiers in disguise (History Cannot Be Forgotten: A Complete Record of the Atrocities the Japanese Invaders Committed in Anhui, Part 2). In Taoxi village (Shucheng County), the Japanese burned over 1,000 houses and killed over 40 people (History Cannot Be Forgotten: A Complete Record of the Atrocities the Japanese Invaders Committed in Anhui, Part 2). At Nangang (also in Shucheng County), Japanese soldiers killed over 200 people and raped women, many of whom were over 60 (History Cannot Be Forgotten: A Complete Record of the Atrocities the Japanese Invaders Committed in Anhui, Part 2). These and other atrocities came to be a standard operating procedure for Japanese soldiers in any areas they passed through.

Chinese Resistance and Japanese Setbacks

If the atrocities the Japanese committed were designed to bully the Chinese into submission, they failed to achieve this objective. At Jianshan, the 20th Army resisted for four days before retreating to Xiaochiyi and Taihu (Hsu and Chang, 241). On June 26th, at Taihu, the 26th Army Group attacked the flanks of the 6th Infantry Division while the 20th and 31st Armies attacked frontally (Ness and Shih, 35). Malaria also affected the 6th Infantry Division, incapacitating 2,000 men and halting its offensive for over a month (Peattie et al., 211–212). However, the Chinese failed to capitalize on these setbacks, merely returning to defensive positions after the 6th Infantry Division withdrew (Ness and Shih, 35).

JM 179, pp 39 Map 4

The Battle of Madang

With the offensive north of the Yangtze temporarily halted, the focus shifted to the fortress at Madang. The Chinese had heavily fortified Madang, placing obstacles in the river and building river-facing gun batteries (Wu, 192–193). Initially, the Japanese naval vessels could not penetrate the defenses. Consequently, the Japanese soon shifted tactics, landing 800 men at Xiangkou, away from Madang’s river-facing gun batteries (Wu, 193). These forces initially conducted a frontal assault across flooded rice fields, which made them easy targets for Chinese riflemen and machine-gunners (Harmsen, 149). However, the frontal assault fixed the attention of Chinese fires and distracted them from the fact that the fortress was being encircled. The absence of many officers (who were attending a graduation ceremony and banquet at a nearby military academy) and the limited garrison (roughly only five hundred men strong) at Madang meant that the Chinese could not effectively counter the Japanese encirclement (Wu, 193–194). Therefore, the Japanese overwhelmed the garrison in three days, capturing Madang on June 26th (Japanese Monograph 179, 41).
​
The rapid fall of Madang shocked Chiang and the KMT, who had expected it to hold out for months. The Chinese attempted to strengthen other forts along the river with central army forces, but failed to consider Japanese proficiency in combined arms amphibious assaults (Wu, 194). The cleared Yangtze River became a logistical highway for the Japanese, facilitating their advance on Wuhan throughout the summer and fall of 1938. The river's dual use as a communication line and means for amphibious landings became a significant disadvantage for the Chinese defenders in the Wuhan campaign.

Sources: 
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1942. W.W. Norton & Company, 2021. 
Harmsen, Peter. Storm Clouds over the Pacific, 1931-1941. Casemate, 2018.
Hsu, Long-hsuen, and Ming-kai Chang. History of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945).
Chung Wu Publishing, 1972. 
MacKinnon, Stephen R., and Robert Capa. Wuhan, 1938: War, Refugees, and the
Making of Modern China. University of California Press, 2008.
Macri, Franco David. Clash of Empires in South China: The Allied Nations’ Proxy War
with Japan, 1935-1941. University Press of Kansas, 2015. 

Ness, Leland. Kangzhan. Helion and Company, 2016. 
Peattie, Mark. The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese
War of 1937-1945. Stanford University Press, 2022. 
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East. Central China Area Operations Record, July 1937-May 1941, Office of the Chief of
Military History, Dept. of the Army. 
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East. South China Area Operations Record, July 1937-May 1941, Office of the Chief of
Military History, Dept. of the Army. ​
Whitehurst, G. William. The China Incident: Igniting the Second Sino-Japanese War.
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2021.
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https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344520961548.
“历史不能忘记：侵华日军在安徽暴行全记录（二）[History Cannot Be Forgotten: A
Complete Record of the Atrocities the Japanese Invaders Committed in Anhui, Part 2]
2015-04-27 08:51:45  来源 ：安徽文化网  点击：  复制链接.” 历史不能忘记：侵华日军
在安徽暴行全记录（二） - 综合资料 - 抗日战争纪念网, www.krzzjn.com/show-608-
9708.html. Accessed 1 Nov. 2024.​

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